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EPIM Mapping of Narrative Tactics in the Migration Sector

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EPIM Mapping of Narrative Tactics in the Migration Sector

This report summarizes the findings of a mapping exercise conducted on behalf of the European Programme on Integration and Migration (EPIM) between April-June 2019. The first aim was to investigate the extent of progressive 'narrative development' work taking place in the European migration and integration sectors. The second was to collate narratives frequently used by NGOs, highlighting those found to be most resonant or dissonant. The mapping exercise was conducted primarily to better inform EPIM's members, who make grants under an EPIM thematic fund on strategic communications, but also to share examples of promising practice among their grantees and other NGOs.

The research found that audience-centred work on narrative is widely understood by European migration NGOs to be a cornerstone of strategic communications, but that most such organisations remain at an early stage of implementing this work on a routine basis. Organisations working where in-depth audience segmentation research has been published were inspired to develop strategies that better target specific audience segments. Elsewhere, segmentation research should be a future funding priority, though there appear sufficient commonalities between segments in different European countries for some level of strategic communications work to already proceed by analogy.

Among organisations crafting narratives about their activities, there is a division between those who focus on segments of the 'conflicted middle' and those who focus on mobilising and expanding their supportive base, though all acknowledge the need to do 'both/and', not 'either/or'. Better national coordination, with division of efforts according to audience focus and mission, should therefore be achievable, in principle, in all the countries mapped. This national coordination was seen by some as a pre-condition for transnational (pan-European or global) coordination. There was general enthusiasm, amid a few reservations, for greater narrative alignment across Europe's migration advocacy organisations, and for sharing research, tools and applied practice across different progressive sectors.

The majority of organisations report that they attempt to message test regularly, but few feel confident about how they evaluate the impact of their narrative work. Many organisations doubt the existence of a progressive meta-narrative which can successfully challenge the over-simplified threat narratives of the nativists. They therefore tend to rely instead on mid-level (policy-related) narratives and micro-narratives (positive, individualised stories involving migrants and refugees). There is widespread concern about whether these smaller, often localised narratives can be elevated, multiplied and amplified to the necessary mainstream volume. On a more positive note, there appears to be a growing synergy between the need to generate and elevate micro-narratives of solidarity and reciprocity (between locals and newcomers) and an increasing desire to build more grassroots-led social movements, relating to migration, throughout Europe.

Positive integration stories are the dominant type of narrative, both now and in most planned campaigns, because of their capacity to appeal to a wide audience in simple and positive ways. Other, harder-edged migration policy issues are rarely the subject of strategic public communications work, and, if/when they are, there are only a few value-led approaches (appeals to family, or the blamelessness of children) that produce invariably positive results. National security and anti-Muslim sentiment were, in particular, found to be dangerously neglected narrative territory. In general, a growing number of researchers and practitioners questioned the tactic of not mentioning nativist/populist opponents' frames, and were instead discovering the effectiveness of ethical 'journey' narratives that begin by acknowledging people's conflicted feelings and fears.

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Introduction: Purpose and Methodology

This is an assessment of the current state of 'narrative development'[1] work in the European non-governmental migration and integration sector, with an emphasis on the narratives used to promote or defend the rights and well-being of refugees and migrants. While a great deal of academic and other attention has been given to the nature of populist and nativist narratives of threat [see **Appendix 4**], there has been comparatively little study of progressive narratives relating to migration and how they may be improved to become more resonant, and/or more widely aligned. The primary purpose of this research was therefore to better inform the foundations who are members of the EPIM consortium on these issues.

The mapping, conducted over approximately 10 weeks, is necessarily a partial snap-shot of the field. It focuses on two main areas:

- **Part 1**: The level of understanding, implementation and sophistication of narrative work within organisations in the sector; and
- **Part 2**: Actual narratives that are being put into practice and their self-evaluated effectiveness in relation to self-defined goals.

Resource constraints that put limits on each organisation's capacity to undertake what is broadly termed 'strategic communications' are largely excluded from this analysis. Similarly, other non-narrative variables that may determine the effectiveness of a given communication – such as style, format, channel, platform, etc – are considered only in passing. For the sake of manageability, the closely related tactics of combatting hate speech and disinformation, as well as the debate about the state of Europe's media, and media narratives not directly traceable to refugee and migrant advocates,[2] are not mapped by this research.

The research began by mapping recent mapping exercises with overlapping terms of reference[3] and by reviewing the literature that is relevant, directly or by analogy, to narratives in the migration field. A bibliography of some 150 publications or online materials, a few of which are cited in this report, can be found in **Appendix 1**.

Simultaneously, a list of 10 key questions (and a working definition of 'narrative') was prepared, which was circulated to potential interviewees [see **Appendix 2** – Basic Interview Structure]. Approximately 120 organisations and individuals were emailed and invited to participate in the exercise, having been selected to reflect a diversity of scale, mandate, geography and other characteristics. Although the majority were based in Europe and were non-governmental, influential organisations in North America and Australia were also contacted, and staff of several inter-governmental organisations were invited to give their perspectives. No representatives of local or national governments were interviewed.

Of those contacted, 66 organisations [see **Appendix 3**] were interviewed (via a total of 72 interviews conducted by conference call or in person) and information was gathered on the work of at least another two dozen. Each organisation's current public communications output, available on websites and social media, was sampled prior to the scheduled interview, which typically lasted 30-60 minutes and often digressed from the basic structure in order to allow candid and reflective conversations.

Part 1: Extent of Narrative Development Work

The most important innovators and promoters of narrative change, in the sense of strategic communications work, came to Europe over a decade ago from the United States and from backgrounds in community organising and/or political campaign strategy.[4] At the invitation of particular funders, a series of transatlantic 'learning exchange' workshops commenced in 2012, which were particularly focused on changing the dynamic of debate in the UK. This British foothold then spread to those regions of Europe which most often work in English, and now, since the nativist upsurge starting in 2016, their approach is widely known throughout the Continent. This impression of **Anglo-Saxon dominance** was confirmed by many interviewees and may pose a problem if Brexit creates greater detachment between British and Continental organisations.

Though the interviewees were self-selecting or recommended by one another, and may therefore consist only of those with some belief in the importance of narrative development, the mapping found **no-one who was unable to recite, unprompted, at least a few basic principles of the approach**:

- Positivity and hope-based communication;
- Humanisation as opposed to massification;
- Audience-centred content;
- Outreach to some part of the 'middle' ground of public opinion.

Being able to describe what one should be doing in principle, and putting it into routine practice, however, are two different things. Only in the last 3-5 years have a handful of catalyst organisations, including EPIM and its partners, been helping migrant and refugee organisations in Europe to implement work on framing and narratives.

NETWORKING

Networking has been led by parallel objectives: organisations' desire to learn from one another's communications practice, and, wherever possible, the desire to create greater alignment and amplification of public communications in order to counter some of the negative narratives in circulation.

The following section gives an overview of the influence of key funders and expert 'catalyst' organisations in Europe, indicating who has worked most closely with whom, and a mapping of national coordination and centralisation efforts where these were clear. It also mentions some new initiatives that may lead to greater international coordination. It concludes with observations

on the extent of networking between non-governmental and governmental organisations in this field, and on the need to involve more non-governmental organisations who provide services on behalf of governments.

Catalysts and conveners

The Social Change Initiative (SCI), based in Belfast, has been a crucial catalyst for narrative development in the European migration and integration sectors, via a programme that is due to wind down at the end of 2020 and which originally included a 'Migration Learning Exchange' between US and European organisations.[5] SCI has funded two prominent organisations, The International Centre for Policy Advocacy (ICPA) and More in Common (MiC), whose products were often cited as useful by those interviewed. ICPA, based in Berlin and originally pointed towards narrative work by an OSF project on Roma, works in Germany, Greece, Spain and Italy. Its Facebook page, which is used mostly, but not only, by German organisations, provides a point of intersection and exchange. ICPA's site contains a much-cited toolkit for narrative change, including a page of example campaigns, with summary of their narratives and values (all, notably, taken from Anglo-Saxon organisations). MiC, meanwhile, has gained its reputation primarily on the basis of its audience segmentation research, conducted using a trademarked methodology; the extent to which it is now following through on that research by applying it to specific narrative development projects in France and Germany is less widely known.[6]

EPIM has similarly funded communications capacity building in Europe, and convened grantees and others to share learning. European conferences were jointly organised by EPIM and SCI in 2017 and 2018, which included narrative strategy discussion; interviewees who attended asked for more such gatherings and trainings. In 2019-20, EPIM continues to support the Platform for International Coordination on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), the European Network on Statelessness (ENS) and Refugees Welcome with pursuing targeted communications strategies.

On a parallel track, another transfer of American to European practice has taken place via the influence of Anat Shenker-Osario's company, ASO Communications. ASO has worked closely with Thomas Coombes of Amnesty International, who has been particularly active in spreading the word about narrative change techniques throughout the wider human rights community, with a focus on hope-based communications. Coombes is also inspired by the innovative work on movement building and narrative change, in Colombia and Hungary, of a group named Just Labs.

Meanwhile the Open Society Foundation (OSF) / Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI), perhaps also thanks to its transatlantic character, has been interested in public attitudes and narratives for public communications since around 2010, when it worked on how to bring the insights of George Lakoff and the European scholars engaging with those insights into the world of policy. They worked with an organisation named Counterpoint, which has also worked with Crisis International, Caritas, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Missing Children Europe (MCE), Plan International and Stay Human, among others. More recently, OSEPI have been working with a German think-thank named D|Part on a series of reports called 'Voices on Values' based on research in six European countries. OSF remain key funders and conveners in this sphere, operating a global 'community of practice' for their own communications-related staff, which met in person for the first time in June 2019.

National networking and coordination

The American model of '**communications hubs**' (to coordinate campaigning in the migration and integration sector) has yet to be widely adopted at national or regional level in Europe. The two major exceptions are iMix, which is giving tailored help on audience research and message development to about 70 civil society organisations across the UK, and Mediendienst Integration in Germany. Norsensus Mediaforum will become a Nordic hub as of August 2019, but its project work also reaches beyond Scandinavia, and it has equal focus on delivering its own youth-led projects and supporting a diverse range of clients, including public institutions and government ministries. In Italy, Coalizione Italiana Libertà e Diritti civili (CILD) hopes to evolve into a national communications hub over the next couple of years. In Spain there is no NGO hub, but a team of Spanish journalists who will do fact-checking on any dubious migration-related story sent to them.[7] As a generalisation, coordination mechanisms within European countries (related to strategic communication of tested narratives) lag behind the well-resourced, though still imperfect, US infrastructures.[8]

There are a couple organisations which appear to have developed their work on narratives **independent of the Anglo-Saxon-dominated funding and partnership networks** outlined above, perhaps thanks to being self-resourced within large international charities. These are Oxfam Spain, who conducted their own research and produced a report and guide in Spanish (making their natural outreach towards organisations in Latin America rather than the rest of Europe), and Red Cross Austria, which held a major European symposium on migration communications last year, with a report published in German.

International networking and coordination

The European migration and integration sector contains multiple networks defined by beneficiary groups, originally established for the purpose of strategic advocacy directed towards the EU institutions and therefore mostly headquartered in Brussels. While providing clear efficiencies for such advocacy, this structure does not necessarily provide a similar efficiency, nor centralisation of professional expertise, in terms of public communication work, where the 'action' happens almost exclusively at a national or local level. Several Communications Officers interviewed in Brussels spoke about the non-existence of a 'European public' with whom they could communicate directly, beyond the 'bubble' of European governmental officials who consume a number of elite media sources.

Among these networks' central offices, levels of direct experience with, and enthusiasm about, developing narratives to resonate with wider public audiences were found to vary considerably. The Migration Policy Group (MPG) has recently coordinated an ambitious pan-European campaign to collect a European Citizens Initiative (ECI) petition, and both the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and PICUM have begun to coordinate international public campaigns via those member agencies with both the capacity and interest to participate (in ECRE's case, via EMON, its sub-network of communicators, and in PICUM's case via a new communications taskforce among its members). The European Network on Statelessness (ENS) is implementing a new communications strategy with an emphasis on engagement of stateless activists and member organisations, while Refugees Welcome International (RWI), based in Italy, is in the midst of

research about the audience segments for whom they plan to craft narratives.

Despite these networks sharing experience internally among their members, there is not yet anything pan-European or global that can be called a sector-wide network, or 'community of practice', for strategic communicators – a place, for example, where communications teams could compare audience research, message testing or evaluation methods for their various narrative tactics on specific issues. Several interviewees felt that stronger national networks needed to be established before such transnational networking should be made a priority. On the other hand, several evolving international initiatives are moving forward which may help to inspire stronger national networks from the top-down:

- MPG now coordinates the EPIM-funded, Brussels-based Communicators Network within '**EPAM**' (a platform for NGO coordination on migration and asylum), which meets every three months; MPG also coordinates its own annual Transatlantic Migrant Democracy Dialogue.
- EPIM has also been among those advising the Global Centre for Pluralism and its local partner, a communications hub based in Ottawa called Refugee 613, on developing a **worldwide 'community of practice'** with regard to strategic communications. The Global Centre for Pluralism convened an inception workshop in Brussels in early 2019, and another in late June 2019 focused on its practical aspects (funding, governance, membership). It is hoped that a Secretariat will be in operation by the end of 2019.
- Norsensus Mediaforum will likely, depending on the success of its role as a Nordic hub, create an Action Plan for wider internationalisation of its networking and training. Funded by **EEA grants**, they have already worked with organisations in Romania, Poland and Greece, but also in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, and a little in Germany and Ireland.

Networking with governments and government-funded implementing partners

The extent of networking with governmental organisations varied considerably. Several civil society organisations – Oxford University's Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity (GEM) and its 'Inclusive Cities' project, the ICMC's SHARE Network, CILD in Italy and MiC (in partnership with Robert Bosch Stiftung) in Germany – are supporting **local authorities** with their own narrative development processes (almost exclusively focused on reception, integration and diversity issues). Others – Counterpoint, ICPA, Norsensus Mediaforum, and Stay Human – have assisted national **government ministries** as 'expert advisers' in the same way that a media or PR agency might be brought in.

The Brussels-based think-tank, the European Policy Centre (EPC), together with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, is running a project on the **EU institutions' communications** capacity with regard to migration. The project seeks to develop practical recommendations and tools that can help strengthen the EU's communications on migration. The next roundtable, 'Tackling challenges faced by communication actors', will take place in September 2019. EPIM is helping to ensure that existing research and learning is feeding into the process and that civil society input is strengthened.

Several **IGO bodies** – OHCHR, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in Vienna, and the Council of Europe – also involve NGOs in their thinking on these strategic communications issues, working from the common ground of human rights promotion. Overall, however, governmental

training, sharing and discussion tends to take place in separate spheres (e.g. The Roundtable of Public Information Directors comprising about 40 chief communications officers from IGOs, or the OECD Network of Communication Officers on Migration known as NETCOM, or the Brussels-based UN Communications Working Group).

Whether or not governmental agencies can participate directly in a greater alignment of narrative work, those NGOs that they fund to deliver services or to implement overseas humanitarian aid or development projects should become involved in such alignment, despite the implicit constraints placed on their public advocacy roles by such large service-delivery contracts. It is telling that only one of Europe's **national Refugee Councils** responded to the invitation to participate in this mapping, and none of their public communications work came up during interviews with other organisations. Although it made sense for those passionate about narrative change to bypass some of these big, slow-to-change organisations during the crisis of communications that started in 2016, future sector-wide movement building seems unsustainable without bringing such large organisations on board.

The case for and against greater alignment of narratives across Europe

The premise that it is desirable to create commonality/alignment/coordination across as many professional communicators as possible is based on **varying rationales and ambitions**, such as:

- The potential to amplify the volume and consistency of each message, and rival the clear international alignment of nativists;
- The proven viability of international campaigns in corporate advertising which capitalise on behavioural, cognitive and psychological commonality, or the universal appeal of so much in art, literature and film, even when detailed imaginative narratives are being used;
- The potential to maximise efficiency and reduce costs: not reinventing the wheel in each country and sharing the evidence-base more quickly;
- As an adjunct to any joint advocacy campaigns, giving added moral authority to individual organisations and showing solidarity with one another, especially when civil society is under intense attack in several countries;
- The evidence from psychological research that the only chance of real impact with those who are unpersuaded is 'total immersion' in positive messaging, including the idea that there has to be at least twice as much positive narrative as negative narrative, given the evolutionary bias of the human brain towards remembering stories and information that trigger fear;
- The argument that harmonisation of communications defending migrant and refugee rights is a corollary of the European harmonisation of migration policy, and the general 'Europeanisation' of the political rhetoric surrounding migration since 2015;
- An ideological bias on the part of cosmopolitan progressives in favour of international cooperation wherever possible.

However, there were a few important qualifications of, and questions about, this premise:

- Questions about the limits of effective transnational work in the context of cultural specificity, audience segmentation and the current passion for 'localism';
- Scepticism from global or pan-European NGOs based on how hard they have found it to

achieve alignment even within their own organisations or networks;

- Scepticism about how far national audiences are exposed to narratives/media from other countries and languages, and therefore about the ability to build the sense of a positive wave of communications across Europe;
- Concern about relative funding priorities, given that achieving and regularly maintaining alignment across Europe would likely consume energy and resources that, some thought, could be better spent on engagement projects in the field with guaranteed impact, however modest in scale. Several interviewees felt that they had been to too many convenings that didn't really lead to greater cohesion or increase momentum;
- Practical and principled obstacles to greater cooperation between diverse actors, divided by policy positions or by organisational culture and chosen audience-targets;
- A free market bias against centralised planning from entrepreneurial initiatives, and an objection to top-down, funder-led unification from others, preferring to let a 'hundred flowers blossom'.

Nonetheless, the **vast majority of interviewees in this mapping expressed support for the idea of greater alignment of narrative practice.**

'Pushback' against narrative development and strategic communications work?

Only a couple instances of clear 'pushback' against narrative development work were mentioned. One concerned objections raised by a **fundraising** team inside a large international NGO, who pointed out that what works to influence the opinion of the 'conflicted middle' is different from what proves most effective in opening wallets. This is a competition between priorities that all NGOs funded through individual donations will need to confront and address if they cannot segregate and target their public communications for one purpose or the other.

Pushback also erupted at a consensus-building meeting of the UK NGO sector some years ago (with many advocates feeling that strategic communications work was being touted by funders as a greater priority than, and replacement for, more traditional policy and campaigning work), and from the former leadership of one NGO in southern Europe. Generally, however, the issue is not pushback so much as inadequate capacity.

RESEARCH

Civil society organisations in this sector have developed their communications strategies and initiatives based on an understanding of the world that is based on research, both from academia and other engaged organisations. Different research findings provide different starting points for the process of narrative development.

Research on values and psychology

For many professional communicators, narrative development starts with identifying the moral values that they want to trigger, and then works backwards to the specificity of narrative. In this

value-led approach, research from a wide range of sectors, beyond migration and integration, can be relevant. The Common Cause Foundation Handbook, or the work of the Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC) were cited as 'vital' tools in this regard, as was the work of climate change and anti-poverty organisations [cited in **Appendix 1**].

Similarly, those enthused by social and behavioural psychology research approach this work cross-sectorally. See, for example, the recent Thomas Paine Initiative report, '*More Than Words*' (2019), which highlights the value of 'pre-suasion': psychologically prepping an audience, in terms of how they feel, before trying to connect through narrative.[9] More in Common (MiC), which has never been overly bound to the migration and integration sector per se, is one organisation moving towards a psychological-research-led approach as they dig deeper into national contexts. Their report by Dr. Daniel Yudkin, '*The Psychology of Authoritarian Populism*' (June 2018) is the first of several, and they are updating their audience research methodologies in line with such research. Alex Evans, author of *The Myth Gap*, has likewise moved away from a focus on narrative and established A Larger Us: The Collective Psychology Project in 2018, which links the political crises facing a number of sectors with the simultaneous mental health crisis facing western societies.

Audience segmentation research

The majority of NGOs work from over-arching values only in the sense of using audience segmentation research, which references values, as a starting point to inform their communications strategies and, hence, narrative tactics. While a plethora of public attitudes and 'values' surveys in Europe relate to migration,[10] only a few European countries have recent, in-depth yet applicable audience segmentation research available. These are: the UK, which has the 2011 and 2018 'Fear and Hope' reports from Hope not Hate, the British Social Attitudes Survey and the 'National Conversation' conducted by British Future and its partners in 2017-18[11]; Ireland, commissioned by SCI; Spain, commissioned by Oxfam Spain; and all the European countries on which More in Common (MiC) has published research: Germany, France, Italy, Greece and – forthcoming – The Netherlands. NGOs in other European countries (and Canada) were conscious of a lack of such national research holding back their efforts and considered that this should be a funding priority, especially in central and eastern Europe. [12]

There may be negative side-effects of conducting public opinion research on migration, however. In countries where it is common, and where the results are constantly being reported in the news, this fact confirms the framing of migration as a problem in the public consciousness. Lending great moral and political authority to polling results can also invite a response called 'push-polling' from nativists and populists seeking legitimacy.[13]

The MiC reports show that what many call the 'anxious middle', but which may better be called the 'conflicted middle'[14] since they should not be caricatured as over-anxious, exists in most if not all European countries. It is crucial not to conflate these middle segments with centrists or moderates; they are, rather, confused, conflicted and fickle. They are, more importantly, the people open to persuasion, and British Future compliments them further by portraying them as 'balancers' whose opinions are constantly dealing in trade-offs between the pressures and positives of immigration.

Along the same lines, the new research 'Voices on Values' has been conducted around trade-off questions, forcing people to choose between opposing values in specific situations. Their findings give cause for optimism that values of freedom and openness ultimately trump economic concerns. The 'social listening consultancy' Bakamo, on the other hand, reached the depressing conclusion that humanitarian action has become more of a conditional trade-off (against self-sacrifice, self-interest and self-risk) than it once was.

Overall, the MiC research teaches the danger of generalisations and the importance of local context, but **several commonalities can be identified between public attitude findings across Europe**:

- Educational level is the most significant determinant with regard to anti-immigrant sentiment;
- Most of the 'conflicted middle' tend to be older, less educated, native-born, working class or less well-off, and usually live outside major cosmopolitan cities;
- Since most people are balancers, there is more to be gained in democratic popularity by a moderated policy stance than an extreme one.

Indeed, the ED of MiC estimates that there are probably two-thirds commonalities and only one-third nationally specific characteristics within most European audiences. Refugees Welcome International's internal research agreed that there were great similarities in the profile of their supportive base and the 'conflicted middle' in a dozen European countries. This suggests that migrant and refugee organisations' communicators should be able to work by 'educated analogy' on developing narrative strategies worth testing locally, even where they are waiting for more detailed national audience segmentation research to be completed.

CHOICE OF TARGET AUDIENCE AND NARRATIVE TACTIC

Narratives are inescapable and are just as important in political advocacy work, or in the courtroom, as in public communications. In most cases, however, this mapping focused on public **communications narratives**. These can be:

- An adjunct to advocacy – moving people to take action and get involved;
- Used for self-promotion – raising funds and brand awareness;
- Used to influence public opinion – either as an end in itself, or in order to widen the political space for good decision-making.

With terminology drawn from the audience segmentation research described above, interviewees indicated whether their public communications work focused on:

- Mobilising 'supporters' (those already or previously signalling or taking any action to show support)
- Expanding their 'base' (those who share the same values, assumptions and opinions as supporters, but who may not yet have demonstrated concern or support)
- Influencing the 'middle' (those who are conflicted in their views about migration, in various different ways), or
- Challenging 'opponents' (the minority who hold and demonstrate strongly anti-immigration/refugee views and who are unlikely to change those views).

While it takes a lot of communications capacity and innovation just to mobilise supporters and appeal to the base, these are audiences more likely to be influenced by the traditional (rights-or-justice-based, humanitarian or liberal) appeals of refugee and migrant NGOs, and broadly similar in profile and mindset to the people who staff such organisations. Narratives can be tweaked based on research and testing with these sympathetic groups, particularly because there is no hard and fast line between the four segments, but the need for more radical and imaginative rethinking of narratives is logically greater among those organisations trying to influence the 'middle'.

Several recent refugee/migrant NGO campaigns in Europe have focused on the lead up to elections – especially the May 2019 EP elections – calling for voter registration and turnout. Although their goals are technically non-partisan, involving promotion of civic participation – Generation 2.0 getting second generation migrants in Greece to vote; ECRE getting 'new Europeans' to vote for the first time in its #YourVoteOurFuture campaign; MPG campaigning for migrant registration in Brussels or helping migrants to find the MEP candidate that best matches their views – this work to directly activate voters is nonetheless a new departure for the European migration sector. Perhaps strategic communication's focus on public attitudes and polling inevitably leads organisations, like the American NGOs before them, towards this more politicised direction. The question is then whether success is ultimately measured by impact on electoral results.[15]

In summary, those mapped can be broadly grouped into three categories:

(1) 'Meeting the middle where they are'

This approach:

- Focuses on rebuilding democratic consent for public policy, and on civic nationalism, often using collective displays of multicultural belonging;
- Aims to unblock stalled immigration policy debates by this means; and
- Is mostly (though not exclusively) a medium-term strategy for containing and defusing right-wing extremism and electoral polarisation.

MiC, British Future, CILD and several IGOs fall into this category because they are trying to connect with audiences who, based on Jonathan Haidt's 'Moral Foundations Theory', also hold non-liberal values of purity, loyalty, security and authority. Impartial agencies advising governments on how to craft their messages – such as Bakamo, which has advised EU officials to speak more about security screening at borders in order to reassure the public, or the EUI's Migration Policy Centre[16] – also tend to work with a logic of matching the message to the audience. UNHCR's Innovation Service 'thought leaders' in this area are also clearly influenced by Haidt.

(2) 'It's not about saying what's popular; it's about making what you want to say more popular'

This approach:

- Focuses on mobilisation and expansion of base, or at least carrying them with you at all times;
- Is usually a long-term strategy in terms of converting the majority to more progressive values and opinions.

There is a distinction within this category between those who do not adapt their liberal narrative in any way – such as Migreurop, for example, who proudly insist on the consistency of their narrative regardless of audience – and those who try to speak to the 'would-be-liberal' inside of everyone, such as PIRC and ILGA, or Amnesty International, following Anat Shenker-Osario's research. As Shenker-Osario puts it, 'Conventional wisdom says to meet people where they are. But, on most issues, where they are is unacceptable. Applying tools from cognition and linguistics, we uncover where people are capable of going and how to use our words, images and stories to move them.' The Amnesty strategy, for example, is to mobilise their base (some 5% of the general population) in order to become persuaders of the adjoining 10% who are more sceptical, and then to build gradually upwards from there. They see any other strategy as accepting the false narrative that Amnesty speaks only for the values of marginal leftist-liberals.

In practical terms, Shenker-Osario's testing methodology reflects this approach by keeping extremist segments in her tests, so that she can check that extreme nativists are suitably repelled by a particular message ('if they don't like what you're saying then you are on the right track') and so that ultra-liberals are not completely alienated.

Often categories (1) and (2) are cast in opposition to one another. No empirical testing yet devised can settle the question of which is the more strategic approach to values, and organisations from both (1) and (2) agreed, when asked, that it was important to do 'both/and' (base and middle) rather than 'either/or'. The disagreement, removed from issues of funding competition, seems to be a relatively minor one about whether a single organisation should simultaneously empower the base, engage the middle, and marginalise extreme opponents, or **whether separate organisations should tackle separate tasks**. Though both categories share a strategy of ultimately drawing people from the middle to supporting progressive migration policies, there is also substantive argument about whether or not such engagement necessarily means sounding more like a centrist political party.

(3) 'We're not the right messengers'

This approach:

- Focuses on confronting the most negative voices and forces, or on addressing specialised technical audiences or issues, or on immediate crises; and
- Belongs to advocates either too high up or too close to ground to prioritise development of narratives with wider appeal, though in some cases happy to work in parallel or coalition with others who do so.

This might sound like a strangely amalgamated category, but it is really about NGOs who have made conscious decisions to abstain from reaching any segment of the true 'middle'. An organisation like Sea-Watch describes itself on Twitter as 'the last remaining witness' in the Mediterranean and knows that no-one is going to mistake them for a neutral messenger so there is no point trying to pretend that they are. This category also includes those embattled advocates who are silent about their operational work with migrants and refugees because of real or perceived threats of being associated with such work.[17]

An organisation such as ECRE, though moving towards initiatives addressed to wider public targets, is focused on 'reachable activists' and EU policy decision makers because it understands that its added value and legitimacy lies mainly in its technical expertise. It argues that others – political parties, sports associations, celebrities and trade unions, for example – would be better messengers of narratives for the 'conflicted middle' than any rights-based NGO. Similarly, those organisations who primarily provide legal services at national level were very aware of their constraints in terms of relatable public campaigning.

(4) 'It's about changing the weather'

This approach, which overlaps with several of the above:

- Focuses on working via popular culture to reach the widest audience and change public opinion,[18] and/or with children and young people via schools;
- Is extremely long-term and challenging to evaluate.

Examples of outreach work in schools and with young people include: Narrative 4, a global 'story exchange' project started in the US and now working in Ireland; CILD's work with 17-18 year olds in northern Italy, running workshops on the new immigration law, and two documentaries involving youth interacting with refugees (one of which is still in production until end of 2019); Generation 2.0's development of the 'Diversity Volcano' boardgame for teaching young people about migration through play; Norsensus Mediaforum's work with youth groups such as the Norwegian YMCA; Hungarian Helsinki Committee's plans to launch something similar in future; and Oxfam Spain's project with over 60 schools who built and destroyed a symbolic wall.

Work focused on changing attitudes through the narratives of popular culture includes: Unbound Philanthropy's Pop Culture Collaborative in the US;[19] the work of Counterpoint Arts in the UK and Ireland; and the many promising examples (mostly British) described in the 'Riding the Waves' report, also commissioned by Unbound Philanthropy.

CONTENT GENERATION

How material is identified and shaped for the human (individualised, local) stories that are told by migrant and refugee supporting organisations involves subtle questions of ethics, ownership and authenticity. The following three sections – content generation, narrative development and testing, and choice of messengers – are closely intertwined.

Practising what we preach

For many organisations, the imperatives of communication with the 'conflicted middle' have encouraged internal soul-searching about how connected to the grassroots and local level they really are. More specifically, the need for authentic content from projects designed around the values of solidarity or reciprocity seems to be acting as one of several drivers for organisational transformation among European NGOs – increasing their interest in mobilisation, movement-building, grassroots engagement, community organisation, face-to-face engagement, localised 'encounters' or 'interactions'.

This is partly the result of the many spontaneous expressions of solidarity that emerged across Europe in 2015, with organisations wishing to maintain the activation of those new joiners.[20] However, the synergy between projects on the ground and the need to produce narratives showcasing successful solidarity for the purpose of wider public consumption, is new. Some of the pushback against communications has always been about 'tails wagging dogs', but strategic communications imperatives may now be helping to create healthier, more authentic organisations.

Recent research supports the finding that the 'air war' of media campaigning requires reinforcement through the audience member's positive experience of a personal interaction in real life soon after hearing the larger positive message (i.e. the 'ground war').[21] As one interviewee emphasised, it is an illusion that you can push a 'narrative' button or find a shortcut that will save you the work of engaging in a bigger sociological project. Narrative is only about the opening. To reach scale, organisations must embrace the idea of movement building and invest in the 'ground war' too. Organisations such as ICPA and Just Labs therefore think of themselves as catalysts for sectoral transformation rather than as communications organisations.

A few examples of grassroots projects or interactions, simultaneously utilised as raw material for public communications, include:

- The European Network on Statelessness (ENS) strategy of deeper engagement with their beneficiary group (starting with pilots in five European countries) parallel to increasing the number of stateless voices in ENS communications.
- Norsensus Mediaforum's training of youth groups with diverse participants.
- Multikulti's work on organising 'encounters' where Bulgarian locals can meet foreigners.
- Numerous buddy-matching projects (whether for friendship, orientation or employment), such as that of SINGA.[22] Counterpoint notes the metaphorically 'romantic' appeal of these match-making narratives.[23]
- The Refugees Welcome model of hosting refugees in locals' homes.
- The Helferkreis (Helper's Circle) set up throughout Germany to support new arrivals in 2015. Counterpoint observes that these groups were not just 'working for integration' but rather 'they are integration' (Bonne Année, p.103)
- The bike workshop in Crotone, Italy, where refugees work together with young Italians run by SOS Children's Villages (which was then publicised on World Refugee Day last year).
- The RESET programme in which as many as 30-50 people are put into supportive contact with a single refugee family resettled to the UK.

In some cases, there are staff tasked with 'story spotting' – bringing content (usually individualised micro-narratives; see Part 2) from the field to headquarters' attention for communications use – whereas others expect all their staff to be on the look-out for positive narratives. This tends to meld with an increasing expectation that frontline staff will blog, vlog or otherwise 'give a human face' to the work they do.

NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND MESSAGE TESTING

Research applied to practice

The mapping found an encouraging convergence between the specialised communications research and catalyst agencies such as More in Common (MiC) – who are increasingly launching projects or partnerships to demonstrate how their findings can be applied in practice – and those NGOs who are gradually building their capacity for in-house audience research and message testing, which will ultimately allow them to own the process, connect with their audiences, save money, and make narrative development more embedded and sustainable.

MiC is now working closely to support the Catholic Church in France and the major Trade Unions and welfare associations in Germany with their own processes of narrative modernisation, but also in order to use them as 'counter polarisation spaces' for both immigration and Islamophobia. MiC regards it as a mutually beneficial process, meeting communications goals on both sides.[24] Such work is designed to overcome inertia and scepticism within the sector about communicating beyond the base; it will also help to keep MiC's research focused on the challenges of hands-on narrative development. British Future similarly believes it is better to demonstrate the feasibility of developing new narratives for the 'conflicted middle' by running successful public campaigns, rather than merely researching public attitudes.[25]

Message testing

Those interviewed who said they routinely pre-test messages with their intended audiences were: Amnesty, British Future, ENAR, ENS, ICPA, iMix, MK, Migration Exchange, MPG, MiC, Oxfam Spain, PICUM, RightsInfo, SCF, Solidarity Now and Stay Human. Others like JRS, Caritas and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee were just starting to test messages.

In June 2018, ICPA's Narrative Change Lab undertook a major event (moderated by IPSOS) to test early versions of several campaigns with representative focus groups from Germany's 'middle' segments (as defined by MiC: Humanitarian Sceptics and Economic Pragmatists). This event also deserves mention as an example of how one organisation can inspire and share practical learning with others who are less experienced, by letting others observe its work in practice.[26]

One leading US funder gave an example from California and Tennessee of how message-testing can happen dynamically as part of campaigning, [27] rather than needing to be a separate preparatory process via sampling and focus groups. This model, though on a scale unlikely to be replicated with the European sector's more limited resources, should be reassuring to organisations forced to learn by iterative trial and error in the field. Several of the most experienced communications professionals interviewed in Europe also agreed that NGOs should not make excellence the enemy of 'the good' and that funders should look kindly on examples of testing and subsequent adaptation of narrative that happen 'on the move'.

Migrant/refugee participation in narrative development and delivery

So far, organisations in the European migration sector have been better at working with migrants and refugees as messengers than at involving them in the creative process of content generation and narrative development, since reaching the 'conflicted middle' (or even the native 'base') is not about what resonates with them as newcomers. However, widespread failure to involve newcomers, to test whether they feel comfortable with the narrative selected for the settled/native middle, is problematic. One organisation also explained that they do not usually test narratives with segments of the long-integrated ethnic minority population because such a 'minority boost' to the polling quadruples its cost.

Both IGOs and NGOs tend to focus on getting more minorities into the media in order to change the narrative by that means:[28] the New Neighbours Project launched by the EU in 2019, for example, or the European Cultural Foundation's project Displaced In Media, which is about training citizen journalists from migrant communities, and connecting them to a broader network of media activists. Thanks to social media, newcomers can easily create and promote their own content, highlighting positive and personalized aspects of their migration experiences. Community media, such as the Refugee Radio Network, is another channel for doing this, as well as for showing the interests and skills of newcomers that have nothing to do with their migration experience.

Few organisations focus on looking inwards to their own diversity when it comes to the development of communications. Migrant or refugee-run organisations obviously do not face this participation issue – the German NGOs with whom ICPA works are run by young Muslims and migrant women, for example – and the current Secretary General of ECRE instituted a rule of a 30% minimum of staff with refugee background, which currently includes their Secretariat's Communications Officer. For most organisations, however, communications teams still see their refugee or migrant beneficiaries or clients as products to sell, rather than as participants in the narrative shaping process, who might engage with the strategy and the audience research that supports it. It is almost as if – if one were to be really cynical – the increasing profile given to refugee and migrant-led organisations advocating for themselves in political fora has prompted 'white' NGOs to find another role for themselves: namely, speaking to their fellow citizens.

Some interviewees were developing innovative methodologies for supporting those with first-hand experience to share their individual stories with the media more healthily and effectively (that is, pointing towards systemic issues rather than personal experiences). Most notable was 'OnRoad Media', a UK charity for improving media coverage of misrepresented groups and issues. It has developed a particular 'slow comms' methodology of curated 'interactions' that involves gently courting mainstream media journalists, in a context of positivity and equality, and interesting them in the individual people who have lived experience of an issue. OnRoad staff then help to maintain that relationship over the medium to long term, until it bears fruit. They give serious attention throughout to the mental 'self-care' of the people telling their stories, and to helping them to frame and convey the emphasis in their narratives precisely as they wish. Currently they are working on a project involving undocumented young people, introduced via contacts in the UK voluntary sector. So far 83% of the journalists OnRoad have brought to 'interactions' have produced something 'new and positive' as a result. Not all migration-related situations, however, lend themselves to those with first-hand experience developing their own narratives in such careful and strategic ways.[29]

CHOICE OF MESSENGERS

The choice of whether an individual narrative should be narrated in the first or third person is linked to the wider question of the most effective individual messenger for a given audience. Apart from refugee/migrant narrators, there has been a drive, for several years now, towards using more 'relatable' first person narrators who are members of the majority community, with less clear vested interest in supporting refugees and migrants. A few examples include:

- PICUM's use of trade union, health or police representatives to talk about the dangers of letting immigration enforcement distort other areas of regulation, medical ethics or public safety;
- Refugee Welcome's use of the hosts involved in their programmes to talk about their positive experiences of hosting;
- British Future's partnership with the British Legion where the latter became the 'perfect messenger' about the historic contribution of Muslim soldiers to the British Army; or
- Save the Children's use of migrant/refugee children's guardians or teachers as narrators of the issues facing those under their care.

However, this tactic should not be confused with simply keeping newcomer and ethnic minority narrators away from communications to the middle, on the assumption that white majorities are more receptive to white messengers. ASO Communication's testing of messages in preparation for a State-level campaign about race in the US found, surprisingly, that it made no difference to American 'persuadables' whether the same narrative was spoken by a white man or a (relatable, because American-sounding) person of colour. It would be interesting to see whether this finding would be replicated by similar testing in Europe, and how important it may be that the spokesperson 'sounds well-integrated'.

More importantly, recent message testing exercises by the Frameworks Institute in the US and by Migration Exchange in the UK now suggest that the 'relatable-native-narrator' approach may need modification, with a move away from single messengers towards small groups of varied messengers speaking in sequence within a single piece. The Frameworks Institute research showed that messengers are 'a volatile frame element', with no single individual able to represent the different aspects of the system and the migration experience, so that better results were gained by narratives told through an assortment of varied individuals. Migration Exchange similarly commissioned testing research for a grantee campaign which found that those polled did not trust any single messenger – no matter what race, nor how relatable – but that they were more likely to trust them in conjunction with one another, as if their different vested interests cancelled each other out when they spoke in the same video. This tactic is illustrated by the ICMC's SHARE Network which is currently supporting local and regional integration actors in smaller cities, municipalities and rural settings across Europe to produce a series of 8 or 9 videos called 'Small Places, Great Hearts' about the benefits of settling there. (These videos, however,

are targeted less to influencing the general public than to other municipalities and to newly arriving refugees).

EVALUATION OF NARRATIVE IMPACT

Evaluation was widely admitted to be the 'Achilles heel' of narrative work, whether by NGOs working at small scale, or by Governments, IGOs or others working at large scale. Current practice is typically to rely on digital metrics or the level of media exposure to decide whether a narrative has gained traction. Coverage by non-liberal or mainstream media is taken as de facto evidence of reaching 'the middle', while some communicators track distinct phrases that they have coined, to see how often these phrases then get echoed, over time, in different media or parliamentary debates. Social media metrics were increasingly dismissed by those interviewed as deceptive and short-termist, but they nonetheless feel they must recite these statistics for funders, in the absence of better indicators.

The barriers to evaluation of narrative work's impact are self-evident. Tying a measurable action to a campaign, such as signing a petition or donating blood, is not necessarily going to indicate whether someone's attitudes have shifted in a way that will last, especially given the fickleness of members of the 'conflicted middle' as soon as another piece of negative narrative comes along.

Longitudinal attitude changes are notoriously difficult to measure, requiring repeated surveys using identical questions and identical methodologies, or a dynamic component to a questionnaire (such as asking people whether they care more or less about something than they did five years ago), or a cohort study to see how attitudes change over the course of a person's lifetime.[30]

Such surveys and studies are extremely imprecise evidence for any relatively modest NGO project trying to measure its own, distinct impact. In the same way, election results are too high and too partisan a bar to be set by European funders when evaluating their grantees. Given how challenging it is, one interviewee suggested the creation of a network/community that concentrated solely on the question of methodologies for monitoring and evaluating narrative work.

Promising and pragmatic ideas for narrative impact evaluation

Nonetheless, this mapping produced a few suggestions with regard to evaluation, such as:

- For organisations who define their goal as opening more **space for liberal decision-making by centrist politicians and officials**,[31] it should be possible to ask a sample of relevant decision-makers a dynamic question about what 'space' they feel they have on asylum, immigration and integration policy – i.e. whether they feel more or less able to make rights-respecting and welcoming choices. While there have been attempts to measure the 'Overton Window' of acceptable public discourse, it does not appear that measuring this window of acceptable political decision-making has been attempted. The only recent research of relevance has been done by the EUI Migration Research Centre, using over 400 interviews with governance actors in Europe and North America. NGOs or their agents could conduct much smaller scale research on an annual basis with those

of their decision-making targets who are approachable and willing to participate. A couple of interviewees who were primarily advocates, not communications staff, were interested in this idea, as well as the idea of 'segmenting' their advocacy targets more precisely by personal values.

- For organisations who define their goal as expansion of their base, evaluation ought to be easier, but there was found to be a surprising disconnect between projects and communication teams, in terms of collecting data that would evidence how many new supporters/volunteers have joined, expressed support, taken action, and – most importantly – their reasons for doing so. This **qualitative research into the views of new joiners** could easily be improved. See Stay Human's innovative work in this area.

- British Future's in-depth evaluation report called 'Crossing Divides' is an interesting model for **work involving a cultural/arts element**, as it was funded by the Arts Council and National Lottery, who had invested significantly in arts and heritage projects (2014-18) aimed at highlighting minority contributions to World War I. It demonstrates that qualitative evaluation is, ultimately, dependent on the funding made available.

- **Repetition of in-depth audience segmentation research at national or sub-national level** will also be a real test of whether progressive narratives, newly introduced at national levels, have impact proportionate to the costs of development. While those undertaking such research are optimistic about the 'shelf-life' of each report produced, it would make sense to repeat them in the same countries on a five-year cycle, or after any major alteration in national circumstances.

Part 2: Progressive Narratives on Migrants and Refugees

Everyone agrees that there is no 'silver bullet' that will work for everyone everywhere. The material that follows is therefore not about providing language to cut-and-paste, and funders obviously do not want to tell their grantees what their narratives ought to be, but at the same time nearly all interviewees were hungry for examples of one another's practice, from which they could perhaps extrapolate intelligently about what is transferrable (especially those without the budgets to do much pre-testing).

TYPOLOGY OF NARRATIVES

This second half of the report is broken down into a series of typologies under three major **headings: micro-narrative, mid-level narrative** and **meta-narrative**.

Micro-narratives: Individual stories

'Exceptional' refugee or migrant micro-narratives

Definition: Narratives which tell individual stories of migrant or refugee experience in a way which implies that the person is exceptional and therefore newsworthy.

Examples:

- Stories of survival in circumstances of exceptional suffering, victimhood and vulnerability (often of the ultra-vulnerable – for example, there are always measurably better public responses to girl children).
- Stories demonstrating agency, resourcefulness, self-empowerment or self-help (or, as The FrameWorks Institute calls it, the value of 'self-makingness'). This includes capitalist success stories, which tend to follow a rags-to-riches and against-all-odds narrative arc. E.g. Open Migration, 24 January 2019 story of Peter [Ositandinma], "the asylum seeker who never gave up".
- Inspiring heroes, paragons of virtue, the 'noble refugee'. E.g. the story of a Syrian refugee girl, Yusra Mardini, who saved the lives of her fellow refugees in the Mediterranean, then became Olympic swimmer and UNHCR ambassador: 'Yusra: Swim for Your Life' (BBC Radio 4, 2016). Yusra's winning and witty personality makes this example much better than most of this type.
- Unexpected, surprising or amusing 'human interest' stories. E.g. the Syrian refugee in Norway who couldn't continue his music studies so instead became a local choir conductor, leading a traditional, Christian choir at Christmas time and teaching them to sing hymns in Arabic.

Pitfalls:

- 'Benevolent othering' risks invoking frames of worthiness – of 'good' versus 'bad' migrants or refugees, similar to the old distinction between the 'deserving' versus 'undeserving' poor. They tend to imply that individuals are responsible for their own fates within basically fair systems and meritocratic societies; that hard work, resilience and honesty are always rewarded.

- Backlash against unrealistically or disingenuously positive stories. Avoiding excessive positivity is a key recommendation in the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) report 'Communicating Strategically about Immigrant Integration'.
- Triggering citizens' fears, through feelings of inadequacy and competition with superhero newcomers, or triggering resentment if the story permits the misinterpretation that the newcomer is being unfairly supported more than locals.
- Backstories (usually of flight and abuse by people-smugglers) as prurient distraction from more urgent issues of the present.
- The disconnect that many in the 'conflicted middle' are able to make between an individual and national policy – saying, 'I like this migrant, but not migration'.

Recommendations:

- Design micro-narratives that clearly signpost systemic failures and rights violations (as well as structural supports that have positively helped the individual to overcome obstacles).
- Design micro-narratives to clearly signpost wider contexts and responsibilities: E.g. realistic reference to situations in countries of origin and transit, or the role of EU actors in the causes of migration or in maintaining poor conditions for deterrent purposes.

Micro-narratives of solidarity

Definition: Narratives that dramatise and advertise citizens'/locals' solidarity with, or support for, newcomers. These are particularly useful for mobilising an organisation's supporters or expanding its base.

Examples:

- Seán Binder is a humanitarian worker whose volunteer work in Lesbos led to an unfair detention, which ultimately prompted a public outcry. He is now a well-known advocate on the issue of criminalisation of solidarity.
- JRS's 'I Get You' European campaign, about how refugees enrich the lives of locals, showed 9 positive narratives of refugees not as victims but alongside local people who are making a change – for example, an old French woman teaching French to a refugee child.

Pitfalls:

- Good Samaritan stories risk attracting new volunteers or supporters with a 'saviour complex' that will be counter-productive and unsustainable when faced with the reality of newcomers' own agency and human complexity.

Recommendations:

- Focusing on the ethical/emotional journeys of those who started with fears or conflicting feelings. E.g. A story in the Hungarian media concerning a Syrian refugee working as a care-giver for the elderly, with elderly Hungarian women speaking about their initial fears and how these fears and prejudices gradually disappeared. (See below, 'The most resonant progressive narratives', for further details on this approach).
- Using heroes of criminalised solidarity, like Seán Binder, to point towards wider systemic solutions: E.g. his video ending with the message that viewers should sign MPG's ECI demanding EU action against criminalisation of solidarity.
- Stories of reciprocity rather than solidarity, the former representing a more equal relationship between host and newcomer [see below, 'The most resonant progressive narratives'].

Fictionalised micro-narratives

Definition: Forms of the above which are presented through fictionalisation, either by a person with first-hand experience or by another artist or writer. Often useful because a wider audience can understand and identify with a character's motives, dilemmas and emotional reactions in a much more compressed amount of time, and because they protect individuals from identification.

Examples:

- Humorous TV or radio programmes – E.g. Finland's The Other Side of Hope, UK sitcom Home, or Refugee Radio Network's sitcom about Ramadan.
- Literature like Little Bee by Chris Cleave, or self-representational anthologies like *The Good Immigrant* and *Our Island II.*

Pitfalls:

- When not well done, can risk falling into stereotypes or over-relying on pathos.
- When not done for popular entertainment, likely to only reach an educated and already supportive audience.
- Open to being discounted by migration sceptics as factually untrue.

Recommendations:

- Leave interpretation open for the audience. Psychologically, having to do some of the imaginative and interpretative work makes a narrative feel more authentic and promotes 'cognitive empathy', which researchers have found to be the most lasting and influential kind of empathy.
- Base fictionalisations on deep, embedded research within migrant or refugee communities. E.g. the work of Lina Srivastava, maker of award-winning films such as '*Who is Dayani Cristal?*' (2013). Srivastava sees such 'participatory media' as different from activist journalism, as journalism should always be primarily about facts, whereas 'participatory media' is about emotional reality. Her stories aim to harness the power of biographical intimacy, but she states she is an activist/advocate first and a storyteller second, so will only tell the story in the most effective way for a given advocacy purpose.

Collective micro-narratives

Definition: Stories about groups of newcomers or migrant communities, which retain a sense of their group/shared identity.

Examples:

- 'The Other Side of…' project run by a refugee-led employment NGO, Mumtaz Integration, to 'rebrand' several refugee nationalities in the Swedish public imagination.
- A positive 'Meet the Somalis' newspaper article.

Pitfalls:

- Potential for replacing negative stereotypes only with slightly more positive stereotypes.
- Maintaining an 'us/them' frame.

Recommendations:

- Focus on individualism and variety of perspectives (E.g. about the need to fully integrate) within national or ethnic groups.
- Best narrated by those with first-hand experience; at a minimum, make newcomers' own voices dominant throughout the narrative.

Mid-level narratives: Policy-related narratives of causation and solution

Emphasising solutions is a central building block of strategic communications. The recommendation from one interviewee with regard to developing effective narratives was therefore '**two parts solution to one part problem**'. It is therefore logical that most narratives used by NGOs are shaped by policy positions held about how particular issues should be better handled. Constructive Journalism, where the journalist must offer not only a problem and its causation but also possible alternative solutions, is the media's version of this.

The implicit NGO narrative that 'We have constructive, concrete and costed solutions' answers the **implicit governmental narrative that NGOs are naïve** and unable to balance either policies or budgets. Such a narrative only resonates, of course, when one does actually have alternatives prepared, and sometimes those alternatives (for example, 'alternatives to detention' short of full freedom of movement) are highly contentious among the supportive base.

Mid-level narratives about specific policy questions tend to refer, implicitly, to larger meta-narratives [see following section] and are usually ineffective if they don't. As the academic Christina Boswell puts it, 'the most compelling narratives are not based on technocratic arguments about economic costs, skills shortages, or demographic trends. Instead they are informed by more visceral concerns about identity, belonging, fairness and entitlement' (Boswell in Ruhs et al, 2019).

The following **policy-related narratives** (and/or examples of research that might inform such narratives) were mapped, but are **not fully covered in later sections**:

Integration narratives

- 'Integration is a two-way street' narratives. This has been the official EU position sine 2003, so should be a non-controversial area of narrative alignment. However, even liberal cosmopolitans are often unclear about what parts of their own culture they are willing to see change; women rights and LGBTQI+ rights groups and others are concerned with painting red-lines; and national policy-makers tend to be influenced by public attitudes surveys suggesting that their citizens think 'integration' simply means being 'rule-abiding, language-learning and tax-paying' (British Future, National Conversation research). Around 80% of Europeans see newcomers' 'commitment to the national way of life' as important and around 75% see the ability to speak the local language as important (Source: Dennison & Drazanova, 2018).

- 'Newcomers wish to integrate but you're not letting them' (by, for example, barring access to language courses or having a discriminatory labour market) is a narrative of unintended policy consequences used to counter the nativist narrative that immigrants do not wish to integrate. Others address this scepticism about the willingness to integrate in other ways: Mumtaz Integration, for example, has a video where a refugee says, 'I would give my kidney for a more relevant job' and in which they highlight the low percentage of newcomers who do not meet the labour office criteria in terms of job search efforts.

- 'See also 'Shared prosperity' narratives, under 'Most resonant progressive narratives'.

Anti-detention narratives

- While the conditions of immigration detention are a widespread problem, 'indefinite detention' is the key issue only in Britain. Researchers recommend using causation narratives to explain why people are sometimes held for extended periods, but then talking about under-resourcing of immigration departments and other factors beyond their detainee's control (e.g. lack of return agreements) rather than casting the Government as incompetent or malicious villains. E.g. the ENS 'Locked in Limbo' report aims to trigger values of justice and fairness, while explaining the causes of statelessness.
- 'Long stays in camps or detention centres sabotage later integration prospects.' It is notable that the often-stigmatised psychological and emotional needs of newcomers (e.g. depression and post-traumatic stress) get mentioned less often in communications trying to 'go positive'. Recently, the harms of living indefinitely in camps, without status, or being detained, are each described more in terms of the damage they may do, in future, to a sense of belonging.

Removal/return narratives

- European public opinion generally supports the deportation of those without a legal right to stay, and older people usually support this more than others.
- At the moment, the only progressive mid-level narratives on this topic are partial ones, coherent only when arguing against the conditions of return being safe in a given country, or pointing out the undue pressures (e.g. detention) being put upon those who 'voluntarily' choose to return.[32]
- PICUM is about to launch a new video campaign against the deportation of children. It has also asked researchers to collect more evidence about people after their deportation in order to properly finish that narrative of harm.

Border control/externalised protection/shifted responsibility narratives

- 'Externalisation of protection is EU-funded refoulement by proxy' is the narrative of the most critical, independent refugee organisations. MSF constructed a uniquely wide-angled, global message when it issued an open letter about the comparable situations that it saw in Nauru, Lesbos and Libya/Italy and called for evacuations from all three. Its decision to refuse all funding from EU governments in light of the EU-Turkey deal was a case of actions speaking louder than any narrative, however.
- Progressive narratives unanimously call for 'safe channels', but do so most often in the reactive context of objecting to border closures or pushbacks, which inadvertently reinforces thinking that there is a moral trade-off between the two (that deterrent measures against irregular migrants are alright so long as there are ways to come legally).

- Opportunity Agenda has been working against the misrepresentation of the US/Mexico border region as a 'barren, dangerous and chaotic wasteland' by elevating everyday stories of its local residents. A number of pieces by progressive journalists on the tolerance shown by local communities in Lampedusa and on the Greek islands are similar in their 'normalising' effect. There may need to be more work on this with regard to the Balkan route into Europe, however, as most western Europeans still associate the Balkans with war and chaos.

- The percentage of the European public agreeing that there is 'not enough control at external borders' varies greatly by Member State, with just 12% of Spaniards giving this response and 48% of Austrians doing so (Dennison and Drazanova, 2018). Overall, this is not a topic suitable for public communications beyond mobilising the base. See, for example, the 'negative' but highly visceral and affecting Sea Watch #HoldYourBreath video of a boy drowning in real time with the message: 'Help us stop the dying'. A number of organisations refer to the Med as 'The moat of Fortress Europe'.

- With regard to people-smuggling, the crucial tactic is to use narratives which attribute responsibility for suffering more to systems/situations than to individual decision-making,[33] since the 'conflicted middle' tends to assume that those being smuggled have put themselves and/or their children in danger by choice.

- 'Migration controls inadvertently cause more (irregular) migration.' This 'diverted flows' narrative of unintended consequences requires further empirical research in different contexts and much louder amplification in order to resonate, as it is profoundly counter-intuitive for most people.

- Progressive mid-level narratives on what Dublin reform and European responsibility sharing should look like in practice (whether fairer redistribution based on Member State capacity or individuals having greater freedom of movement and settlement choice) differ significantly, in parallel with divergent policy positions. European Social Survey findings support redistribution across the EU based on the integration capacity of each country, not newcomer choice.

Asylum procedure/decision narratives

- There is already close alignment, with most progressive advocates calling for some version of 'humane', 'fair' and 'efficient' procedures since the early 1990s, and the European Social Survey finding consistent public support for 'fair' and 'effective' asylum procedures across the whole of Europe. Yet this has not gotten progressives very far; policy makers still fail to reform procedures at both national and European level.

- European NGOs talk about the 'asylum lottery' due to factors such as political interference in decision making. This narrative triggers the value of (procedural) fairness.

- The negative consequences of legal aid cuts tend to be narrated by legal associations in terms of their counter-productivity, triggering the frames of fairness and efficiency. However, narratives contrasting the lack of support for asylum seekers, regarding what could be life and death decisions, to the safeguards and support available for minor criminal infractions, appear unhelpful. Though relatable, they reinforce an association with criminality and are only effective with those who already believe the system to be unjust.

- Regarding strategic litigation on asylum and immigration cases, OSJI evaluations suggest long-running pieces of strategic litigation should always be embedded within a wider campaign that carries along public opinion, otherwise there is a risk of strengthening the backlash against human rights law as an interference in democracy, overly biased towards the interests of ethnic minorities and liberal elites.

EU citizen mobility/emigration and depopulation narratives

- Intra-EU migration is only controversial in countries where State membership of the EU is a key issue (notably the UK) or where emigration of nationals is causing serious social problems (Romania and Poland). Euromed notes that Spanish emigrants are generally absent from the media, even though a study published in 2013 estimated that as many as 700,000 Spaniards had emigrated since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis. They are just called 'Spaniards living abroad' (Euromed, Migration Media Coverage in 17 countries..., 2017). Canadian public communications experience is particularly relevant on this topic.

- FEANTSA, the European homelessness organisation, is addressing prejudiced assumptions of 'social welfare tourism' with explanatory narratives on how and why mobile EU citizens end up homeless in other countries.

Destitute migrant or refugee/access to work narratives

- Caritas France is taking narrative advice about their latest annual report on poverty, since around half their beneficiaries are now newcomers. More broadly, a number of organisations who campaign for the rights of asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers are using efficiency arguments to show that the policies deliberately inflicting destitution, to force rejected asylum seekers to leave Europe, for example, are failing in that cynical aim. See the 'Lift the Ban' campaign by a coalition of UK organisations.

- Progressives tend to respond to narratives of queue-jumping by communicating statistical evidence that non-nationals are not being privileged over locals, or over the children of locals in future. Narratives of locals and newcomers working together to solve common problems are preferable, addressing the same anxieties but without reinforcing the negative frame of competition for scarce resources.

Undocumented migrants and labour exploitation narratives

- 'Regularisation'/'amnesty' is prominent in US debate in a way that it has not yet become in Europe, because US law has always contained pathways to citizenship, other than asylum, for some groups of irregular migrants.

- In Europe, narratives on irregular migration often focus on creating 'firewalls' between immigration enforcement and other services such as health, education and welfare, though some interviewees noted that the 'firewall' was becoming a piece of jargon rather than a living metaphor. E.g. Maternity Action wanted to communicate about women who were not going to prenatal checks because of their immigration status, and targeted local mothers and expecting mothers, asking:

'Can you imagine what it would feel like if you were too scared to go for a check-up?'

- 'It is not the newcomers who pose the threat but the policies of exclusion' is another version, used by city authorities when defending themselves against the public relations consequences if they fail to protect public health, to safeguard children or to combat crime (due to migrant fear of reporting it).
- Narratives that emphasise the non-binary nature of much migration, such as seasonal labour migration, are realistic antidotes to over-simplified public perceptions of migration as primarily refugees moving from A to B. E.g. the recent OSEPI research project, relating to agricultural labour migration in Italy, trying to change the narrative about why people come to Europe irregularly by unpicking the role of the agriculture industry and organised criminals in creating pull factors.

Statelessness narratives

- The European Network on Stateless (ENS) uses narratives about belonging, aiming to trigger values of inclusivity, equality and compassion (that is, progressive universalism complemented with conservative values about the basic human need for a sense of security and community). Everybody understands the need to belong to a nation and relates to a stateless person self-describing this lack.
- Since the most pervasive negative narratives on statelessness are that the person must have done something wrong to lose their nationality, or that they destroyed their own documents in order to hide their true identity, ENS counter these narratives with collective case studies: for example, the Bahrainis who lost their nationality overnight due to an authoritarian decree.

Meta-narratives: Visions of the good society, paradigm shifts and cultural norms

The 'grail' of narrative development is to find resonant meta-narratives which create excitement and hopefulness about the future. Interviewees speculated on the reasons for the imbalance, in terms of power and coherence, between the fear-based nativist meta-narratives [See **Appendix 4**] and the narratives used to defend migration, integration and open societies:

- The **emergence of a radical-right intelligentsia** which links the elite and the margins, giving more fully narrated legitimacy to reactionary politics and to the backlash against progressive reforms;
- The fact that most organisations are not 'pro-migration' in the sense of wanting as many migrants as possible, but are pro-rights and the wellbeing of migrants, which is **already a more complex story** to tell;
- The fact that the positive benefits of migration are **contingent on context**, which does not lend itself to the generalisation needed for good meta-narrative;

- Despite not being 'open borders' if asked, many say 'everyone welcome', and this **internal contradiction of belief is rarely confronted**, leaving meta-narratives weakened by disagreement about whether there should be any limit to globalised movement of people;
- **Legalistic 'critical thinking'** as a core value and way of interacting with the world for many who enter migration sector careers, meaning that they find it easier to deconstruct than construct narratives;
- In contrast, **the personality type of the extremist** as someone who dislikes ambiguity and finds it easier to make unqualified statements about what victory/ triumph looks like;
- Unwillingness to create a message about a '**European Dream**' like the 'American Dream' for fear that would have a magnet effect; and
- **A different timescale** in populist versus progressive narratives: progressive ones tend to focus on the next 3-5 years, whereas populists talk in grand (blurry) sweeps of history, or about 'the fate of our grandchildren'.

If there is any progressive meta-narrative, then none has yet managed to unite a Europe-wide progressive movement and defeat, with its overwhelming resonance, the negative narratives on migration and integration in recent years.

For many, the strategic response to this absence is to aim for **cumulative quantity of micro and mid-level[34] narratives** instead, while proving at the local level that 'immigration isn't a threat to you and yours, and here's why'. But do such narratives have only short-term and small-scale impact? Does it, in other words, take a meta-narrative to defeat a meta-narrative? Certainly, the right individual story can have extraordinary resonance if we are prepared to allow it to represent a larger story, as when Ronald Reagan highlighted the 'Welfare Queens' so as to mobilise Republicans against welfare fraud, or when Donald Trump paraded the 'Angel Moms' whose sons had been killed by undocumented migrants.

Some of the progressive meta-narratives mapped included:

- **'The ability to migrate is becoming one of the defining markers of privilege amid global inequality.'** The latest progressive global analyses link climate change, the growth of slums and global wealth inequality with migration into 'resource enclosures' (to quote Reece Jones' book, *Violent Borders*, 2016).
- **#PeopleBeforeBorders versus #OpenBorders** defines a subtle but important difference in meta-narrative at the more activist end of the spectrum. One World Universalism can point towards compassion at individual level or towards a position about the future of the nation state.
- **'Openness creates strength through innovation, as well as reciprocity of trade and cultures.' / 'It is a sign of cultural confidence and national strength to show welcome and accept change and diversity.'[35]**

- Ethical narratives - e.g. The '**do unto others**' golden rule of Christianity, or, in more secular terms: 'Give to every other human being every right that you claim for yourself' (Thomas Paine, *The Age of Reason*, 1795).

- **'Shared Humanity' / 'We have more in common.'** This tested as the best value basis in the MiC 2016 German research and is reported by AI to be the most common value base among its members and sections. It helps, in short, to be endlessly repeating, 'These are human beings' or 'The government should act with humanity…'. The Dutch organisation 'Stay Human' puts this value into its very name, but CILD avoids narratives that say 'stay human' because they feel this language insults and so alienates the 'conflicted middle'. See also the 'All That We Share' ad that was on Danish TV2.

- **'X' has always been a country of immigration** – See below, 'Most dissonant progressive narratives'.

- **'Migrants bring economic and demographic benefits'** – See below, 'Narratives that may or may not resonate'.

- **'Hypermobile globalism is intrinsic to modernity' / 'X is becoming a country of immigration, so embrace what you can't change.'** As above, this is dissonant for the middle audience segments or indeed anyone nervous about the pace of change, and reinforces a negative frame of individual powerlessness.

- **'We are all immigrants if you look back far enough' / 'Borders and illegal immigrants are both relatively modern inventions' / 'Migration is a normal part of European civilisation and always has been.'** (See, e.g., *Flight Across the Sea* by Erik Lindner, 2019) These emphasise continuity in order to cool debate, and the second narrative reinforces the positive frame that laws are human constructs, which can be reformed.

- **'Europe accepts a relatively small share of the world's refugees.'**

- **'Elite nativists are hypocritically benefitting from global investments, off-shore tax havens, and other forms of globalisation.'** This mapping did not find any testing on the effectiveness of this narrative, beloved of investigative journalists.

- **'We are under an obligation because of white colonialism and its efforts to erase other cultures'** – see, however, 'The most dissonant progressive narratives'.

- **'Nationalism and xenophobia grows from a lack of exposure to the daily reality of diversity.'** There is considerable debate about this 'Contact Theory' of social psychology.

- **'The system isn't working.'** See 'The most resonant progressive narratives', but note the dissonant follow-up analysis: 'Government bureaucracies are high-handed, uncaring and unresponsive', which alienates patriotic citizens, no matter how little they trust their own politicians.

VISUALISATION OF PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES

Here 'visualisation' refers to both literal images and the **visual metaphors** used in verbal narratives. Images of 'positives' are not necessarily the only resonant images: who would have guessed, for example, that a photo of dead (but named) boy on a beach would be the pivotal, mobilising image of the refugee debate in recent years?

Communicators should also note the recent research on **how anti-immigrant groups cynically manipulate some progressively-produced visual content** and re-circulate it with quite different narratives attached. (One conclusion being that it is safer to use video clips with audio, rather than photography, on social media[36]).

- **Game images**, to communicate the dehumanised approach to the issue by high-level decision makers. E.g. this imagery has been used recently by Migreurop in an animated video.[37]
- **Pixelated or hidden faces**, to protect refugee or migrant identity in photographs. The unintentional message is somewhat dehumanising – or may make the subjects appear dangerous, like police suspects. Some organisations use animations to avoid this danger – e.g. 'The Icing on the Cake' from US organisation Storycorps.
- Immigration as **the wind in the country's sails**: position them correctly to catch its positive power. This is the imagery recommended to US advocates by Frameworks Institute research: The sail metaphor suggests that there is stretch in the economy so that it can expand, not remain zero-sum, and they extend the metaphor to say that it is currently angled wrongly by the immigration system. We need to adjust it so that we can 'harness people's skills and brainpower', then the entire boat will move forward for everyone.
- Curing the **invisibility** of suffering. This is a metaphor often used on the subject of undocumented workers and statelessness. E.g. the OHCHR video 'I am not here', which presents several harrowing individual stories of undocumented people around the globe, including an office cleaner in Switzerland. Imagery of **shining a light** is also common for this kind of 'raising awareness' narrative. HumanRights 360's 'X them out – Black Map of Athens' campaign similarly visualised the hidden/invisible criminality of racist attacks in the city, with 25 comic artists drawing pictures of the attacks in an exhibition to accompany the Map.
- **Massification of supporters**. While imagery of migrants and refugees 'flooding in' is a clear negative, visual images of the 'wave' of support and solidarity that crested in 2015, or of packed streets during the People First march against racism in Milan, March 2019, are effective in mobilising the base through the sense of being part of a historically important movement.
- Positive images of **fluidity** linked to modernity and modern identity. E.g. SINGA's founder

is trying to find a powerful metaphor of fluidity to replace the narrative of society as a house, where we only argue about how many locks it should put on the door.

- Imagery of **nature and biology** linked to the idea of migration as a natural process: Humorous imagery, such as the Spanish organisation, Por Causa, that shows the egg and sperm on its homepage and says, 'Life starts with migration'.

(ENGLISH) LANGUAGE ADJUSTMENTS RECOMMENDED TO INCREASE RESONANCE

A number of organisations have published or reported lessons learned about promising ways, by minor adjustments of language, to trigger an intended value, or to pivot effectively from negative to positive narratives. An amalgamation is tabulated below, with the advice attributed to its source where not repeated by several different sources. These are not to be read as universally applicable recommendations, but are included here in a spirit of information sharing, and in order to prompt self-questioning about the sector's traditional terminology, whether in English or in other languages.

CHANGE FROM…	…TO
'Migrants' / 'Refugees' For many years, advocates condemned governments for failing to distinguish refugees from migrants when talking about 'mixed flows', and causality has always been of paramount concern in framing responses to those who move. Now the majority of the sectors' communicators find it a waste of time to make the distinction since so much of the public, when tested, does understand the legal difference but reacts with equal negativity to both categories as 'the other'. Category comparisons that prompt moral judgements about being deserving or undeserving tend to subliminally bring to mind other unmentioned categories – E.g. the refugees left in regions of origin – just as saying 'genuine refugees' immediately makes the listener focus on those who are not.	'Newcomers' + 'With a refugee background' / 'with experience of migration' / 'a person who is a refugee' – plus reminders of humanity at all times by mentioning the words 'person', 'people' and 'human' as much as possible. + Start to call them 'Mothers, children, friends, neighbours, etc'
'Migration' Invokes the image of a collective, animalistic mass, and in political or media discourse the word is really only used to signify problematic forms of human movement. Rarely is this term applied to the global relocations of highly paid staff. Nonetheless it is often too cumbersome to avoid. 'Displacement' similarly objectifies humans in terms of objects moved by the laws of physics.	'People on the move' 'People forced to move'

CHANGE FROM…	…TO
Undocumented vs irregular vs illegal migrants The PICUM 'Words Matters' campaign tried to get journalists, politicians and others to stop calling people 'illegal migrants' and proved relatively successful, despite an upward trending Twitter graph of how often the term 'illegal migration' has appeared in English-language books. However, US research now suggests that all these terms are equally negative in their framing and the attitudes they provoke.	'Undocumented people'
Rights as ends in themselves	Focus on outcomes – what the rights allow to happen (e.g to treat illness)
'The vast majority of Muslims pose no threat to our security'	Frameworks Institute: 'Muslim Americans are our neighbours and our co-workers; they are the kids in our schools and the parents in our parks. America was founded on freedom of religion. We don't exclude people based on whether or how they pray'
'Crisis' The need for some shorthand for referring back to watershed of 2015 causes some difficulty. ECRE has always pushed the narrative that 'This is not a crisis' or at least 'This crisis is/was unnecessary'. Yet IOM statistics show that 21,301 migrants and refugees still entered Europe by sea between Jan-May 2019, with 519 known deaths, so at another level, from the perspective of those involved, the language of 'crisis' is not misplaced.	'Crisis of protection' 'Crisis of reception or management' The 'mediated crisis' 'Crisis of political leadership'
'Integration' Inclusion vs integration vs social cohesion vs assimilation are fine distinctions from a general public viewpoint, though important distinctions to experts in the sector. Since Merkel's statement in Potsdam in October 2010 that multiculturalism had 'failed, utterly failed' and David Cameron's speech to the Munich Security Conference, public debate has been largely shaped by the idea that integration has a tendency to fail. In any case, it is a bureaucratic, Latinate word better avoided in public communications.	'Living well together' 'Settling' / 'Putting down roots'
'Diversity' A word that has become jargon.	'Mutual respect' 'Tolerance'

CHANGE FROM…	…TO
'Solidarity' A very abstract sounding term, and one open to different interpretations. Marine Le Pen, for examples, talks about solidarity being dependent on the nation state and cultural homogeneity.	'Showing friendship' 'Standing beside each other' / 'Standing up for others who are different' 'Stand with' (not 'give to')
'Humanitarian'	Being kind or humane?
'Diaspora'	'Expat Communities'
'Patriotism'	'Inclusive Patriotism'
'Racism' is too often a word understood only in interpersonal terms. Yet 'institutional racism' and 'structural racism' are unhelpfully formal terms.	Need to give clear examples of unconscious bias in action
'Unskilled workers' 'Highly skilled migrants'	'Cleaning staff in schools and hospitals', 'Construction workers' 'Doctors and engineers'
'Indefinite detention' (causes confusion for general public, as is often mixed up with the idea of a life sentence)	Detention without any idea of when there may be release
Redesigning the system / changing the system	Reforms that are really returns to the past (conservation of human rights standards etc) are more popular with the conflicted middle, while it is better to talk about creating new systems than reforming old ones (which sounds like tinkering) when talking to supporters of change
Avoid 'Close relatives' or other collective nouns about family reunification as they evoke the large, extended families of ethnic minorities, which alarms the 'conflicted middle'.	Reminders of exactly how dependent one adult family member can be on another
'Unaccompanied minors' 'Children' even when 18…	'Kids at risk of losing parental care' 'Teenagers' / 'Adolescents'
'Us'/ 'them' Divisive language.	'We' - But be careful to use precisely – Do you mean you and your supporters or the larger 'we' that includes the 'middle'? – The same applies to 'they': use with care.
'Border management' A euphemistic term.	'Fences, walls, soldiers…'

CHANGE FROM…	…TO
Team-based metaphors such as 'levelling the playing field', because they reinforce the frame of competition, winners and losers [source: Opportunity Agenda]	Working together towards 'shared goals' or 'shared prosperity'
'Making a contribution' language	

Some further adjustments suggested, in a range of documents and videos, by ASO Communications include:

- 'They are not terrorists' ⇨ 'They, more than anyone, fear terrorists' [though note that the MiC German research in 2016 found many 'Humanitarian Sceptics' rightly pointed out that the causes of movement are more complex than merely being the victims of extremists, therefore they rejected that narrative – MiC 2017, p.71]
- Refugee protection as end in itself ⇨ explaining what new hope/start it will lead to for those concerned
- Not fixing or ending or helping to prevent something ⇨ creating or respecting or ensuring
- 'Fleeing danger' ⇨ 'living free from danger'
- 'It is not illegal to seek asylum' ⇨ 'when people cross borders their human rights come with them' [Not strictly synonymous]
- 'As Swedes, we should…' ⇨ 'As caring people, we should…'
- Keeping the border out of people's imaginations. 'People crossing our border' or even 'People entering our country' ⇨ 'People coming here'
- Name the cause of harms, and avoid skirting blame with passive phrasing, especially when aiming to mobilise the supportive base around a dramatic problem. E.g. 'Conditions worsened' ⇨ 'The government decided' or 'leaders chose'. To believe a problem can be fixed through human action, supporters must believe that human action caused it.

SLOGANS VERSUS NARRATIVES?

The mapping found that many of these frames or values – such as 'togetherness'[38] (unity), 'welcome'[39] (hospitality) or 'home' (security) – tend to get used as shorthand tags or slogans in large-scale national or international campaigns, because they are broad enough to be accepted by diverse memberships or coalitions when negotiating alignment. Partners then adapt the headline slogan to whatever they think resonates locally. Instead of apologising for this use of a simple slogan, rather than an elaborated narrative (in the sense of a story that implies elements like causation and solution, usually with a sense of past, present and future, and with heroes and villains as far as possible) such organisations should celebrate this tactic of adaptability, which is the champion of an important book on effective communications in the era of social media, *New Power* (2018) by Jeremy Heimans and Henry Timms.

Examples of localised narratives built around a common core value include the Welcoming America billboards and their rebranding of cities to better 'welcome' diversity, or similarly the Inclusive Cities project in the UK (a partner of Welcoming International). In Bavaria, meanwhile, ICPA is working on 'repurposing the idea of home [*Heimat*] and tradition' in a way that will appeal to a target audience of CSU votes with strong regional pride. JUMA has taken the 'Together Human' slogan but expressed it through a story about young Muslims doing everyday things, but also very German things, like walking in nature.

THE MOST RESONANT PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES

Below are the most important findings in terms of which progressive narratives have proved to be resonant, through pre-testing or experience, in Europe or the US. The Anglo-Saxon dominance of this field, mentioned in Part 1, is reflected in the examples, which have been largely selected because there is audience testing evidence to support their inclusion.

Without re-testing, it must remain pure conjecture whether particular narratives from one context will resonate in another. Certainly, the narratives below appear worth NGOs testing for themselves with their own audiences.

Emotional journeys of 'conflicted' citizens

The emotional/ethical journeys of European citizens who were 'conflicted' about migrants and refugees but then came to a more positive personal position or action have been shown, by separate pieces of testing, to be highly effective in influencing the 'conflicted middle': conflicted people seem to like to hear from other equally conflicted people. The journey narrative is therefore no longer across the Med in a sinking boat, but rather the host citizen's journey from fear to realising that immigrants and refugees do not pose a threat. The narrative must not eradicate or whitewash internal doubts and conflicts, but normalises the idea that integration is hard, but ultimately rewarding, for all concerned.

The large canvassing project in California and Tennessee described in Part 1 is finding that the winning formula for conversations on doorsteps is: Listen and acknowledge their concerns; get them to a calm place; talk about a time in life when the interviewer needed someone's compassion; here's my story (as a migrant themselves or as someone who made a personal journey to caring about the issue); reiterate that you understand their concerns, and that the system might be hard to change, but 'In the meantime, shouldn't we treat people with basic compassion and dignity?' (This last sounds like a modest 'ask', but this 'In the meantime…' wording is showing promising results in relation to an issue that most ordinary people find too complex and overwhelming to understand.)

Narratives about children and family

A 2016 academic study found that the one and only frame to make any difference whatsoever when applied to American debates about legalisation and regularisation was that of 'family' (Bloemraad, Silva and Voss, 2016).

Examples of this working in European debates were numerous, such as:

- The European Network on Statelessness (ENS) found in polling research that children deprived of education were its most powerful narrative.
- The Czech consortium MK similarly tweeted on the first day of the 2018 school year with the #BackToSchool hashtag, talking about children in detention centres denied access to education.

- The MiC Greek report found strong disagreement from all segments with the idea of sending unaccompanied minors home (MiC, 2019) since the southern European cultural adoration of children is particularly powerful.

Ironically, evidence of effectiveness can also be found in the fact that the main Hungarian State TV channel's editors circulated a memo in 2015 telling employees to stop using images of refugees that showed children. On the other hand, the Frameworks Institute considered the idea that children are blameless as unwise to promote, because it backfires and implies that adult migrants and refugees are to blame. Others recommend using children as a 'wedge' tactic as far as possible, but avoiding the instrumentalised economic narrative about 'investing' in a child in the host country. Narratives about children 'in limbo' are more resonant, according to Save the Children.

With regard to unaccompanied minors, researchers have found that 'destruction of innocence' narratives – E.g. 'No Child Should Grow Up Alone' – and emphasising the need for solutions with 'jointed up thinking' – cooperation across countries and actors – are both effective with many audiences. See the 'Never Alone' ICPA initiative in Italy, for example.

Photo credit: CIAI

Recently the US office of UNHCR enlisted a consultancy company named Civis Analytics to help figure out what messages would elicit American support for aiding Syrian refugees fleeing ISIS. Civis' team was surprised to find that the group's messaging—explaining that refugees underwent thorough security checks and that none had been found to be terrorists—actually caused a backlash of fear. However, when Republicans were told that more than 50 percent of refugees were children, that message saw a 7 percent swing towards increased support.

In-depth message testing on 'Winning the argument to keep families together' by British Future, who is collaborating on a #FamiliesTogether campaign with UNHCR, Amnesty and Oxfam, found:

- Campaigning to remove the Minimum Income Requirement for family reunification by stressing the unfairness of the rules treating rich and poor differently were successful, as this frame is ingrained in our neoliberal model.
- Family reunification messages are most resonant with ages 25-34 who have or are thinking about getting married and having a family. Having grandchildren made no significant difference to people's empathy.
- Counter-productive/defensive reactions were triggered in patriotic audience segments when campaigners blamed the Government or any government department. This tended to make people say that people should reunite in another country or that they should have known the rules before one person moved without the other(s).
- The predictable finding that reuniting minors with parents is more popular than reuniting adults with adult parents or other dependents. The difference relates to people's

protective instinct, so progressives arguing for reunification of adults need to emphasise the urge to protect your family members throughout your whole life.

- A rejection by nationally proud segments of narratives blaming the national government or one of its departments for the problem.

(Ballinger, Steve, Alessandra Sciarra and Jill Rutter, 'Winning the argument to keep families together: Summary', *British Future*, May 2019)

In the US, unfortunately, in response to government policies, progressives need to produce rather more 'do no harm' narratives, such as: 'No child should have to live in fear of being separated from his or her parents' (Frameworks Institute's most successful message on family reunion in testing).

Shared prosperity narratives

American message testing tends to suggest that the most effective economic narratives are those based on the value of 'shared prosperity'. For example: 'Prosperity requires harnessing every individual's skills and energy to grow our country's economy.' Frameworks Institute evidence shows that humanitarian arguments also change economic value perception (i.e. more people say that immigrants make an economic contribution after they have been exposed to humanitarian narratives). They suggest that more pragmatic economic arguments should then follow the 'shared prosperity' opening. Surprisingly, they found that the 'shared prosperity' narratives were helpful for apparently unrelated issues such as legal rights (we need people to access our society in order to contribute to its collective prosperity) and unaccompanied minors (untapped potential for the future). This may be a uniquely American (patriotic, neo-liberal) style of narrative – see below uncertainty on using economic arguments in Europe.

Narratives based on solidarity and reciprocity

Many of the most resonant micro-narratives are examples of solidarity (e.g. the Amnesty story about a woman of Afghan origin in Norway whose local school friends campaigned against her deportation) or reciprocity (e.g. the 'Integrationhaus' in Cologne where migrants go to visit the elderly in care homes as volunteers, partly in order to practice their German). These tend to be more realistic and relatable than stories of individually heroic or successful migrants or refugees, though the dramatization of the attacks on solidarity is emotionally rich material (e.g. Amnesty's defence of 'the Stansted 15', or the video made by MPG featuring Seán Binder).

Audience/local community as hero of the story

In terms of causation, strategic communications tend to be evasive. Where naming-and-shaming is consciously avoided, in order to make an issue more acceptable to the (often patriotic and therefore defensive) 'middle', narratives lose their villains and rights violations lose their perpetrators. This means that an element of drama that is useful in mobilising the base is lost. The need for the narrative to have a 'hero' can often be achieved by making the audience or community feel that they are the hero, by being part of the solution and taking action.

Hope Not Hate research has found that the positivity of local communities about their own prospects leads to more positive reception of refugees. A 'whole community' approach to reception and integration, as long used for development aid programmes overseas, is coming to the fore in Europe, both in terms of project design and public communications narratives. The MiC report on Greece, May 2019, similarly emphasised that local citizens need new narratives to inspire them about their own agency to effect social change.

Research from other sectors emphasises the importance of making people feel that their actions make a difference to global issues, countering the narrative in our own heads that it's naïve to do something small scale. These are 'enabling narratives' in relation to migration and integration, and there is much to learn from the climate change sector on how best to deploy them. Describing past victories in other progressive sectors, when society once changed thanks to a social movement like Stonewall triggers this value – as do micro-narratives such as the video diary of MEP, Majid Majid, on his journey to getting elected.

Our enemies seek to divide us

Anat Shenker-Osario's testing in the US suggests that it is effective to 'narrate scape-goating' – that is, to explicitly talk your audience through the tactics of your opponents and contrast their divisiveness to the unity that you seek, because much of the 'middle' is frightened by social conflict and associates unity with security. In Europe, the PICUM narrative 'We have fought hard for a system that protects all workers' is successfully used to defend undocumented labour from divisive systems of exploitation in much the same way.

The system isn't working

Though a negative statement, it is worth pursuing reform by this narrative means because it is one of the few progressive narratives which is constantly being reinforced by progressives' populist opponents. When it comes to the policy fixes, of course, that commonality would vanish, but at least the meta-narrative is a shared starting point. It is important, however, to emphasise the structural obstacles (under-resourcing, poor design, political interference), rather than the malevolence of the State, if one is seeking resonance beyond one's base. It is also important to extend the narrative towards a solution, or a sense of fatalism about the powerlessness of governments will be triggered.

European public attitudes about immigration are not as negative as you might think

A number of organisations in the sector work at contesting negative narratives, including those told by their fellow progressives, about public attitudes. They emphasise that large percentages remain in the 'conflicted middle' and that little is to be gained by politicians 'going tough' on immigration. Instead of looking at 2015-19 election results and assuming that there is a rise in populism and xenophobia, they explain the right-wing resurgence as pockets of extremism that have simply been given better means of networking via social media, and that have been 'activated' and exploited by cynical leaders.[40] They see immigration as a proxy issue, that needs to be reduced in saliency in order to tackle people's 'real' socio-economic grievances and the crisis of democracy.[41]

The D|Part and Over Zero pieces of research referenced earlier indicated that immigration was not among most Europeans' top concerns. But pollsters' and academics' survey questions that are always framed around quantities of migration have created a lot of reporting in the media about whether there are 'too many', and an 'increasingly visible irregular immigrant population accompanied by increased immigration enforcement can give rise to greater public concern over immigration' even as the numbers of people arriving decline (Social Market Foundation think tank conclusions (May 2019): Lesson No. 4: Enforcement, Reality and Perception).

THE MOST DISSONANT PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES

Below are some of the most dissonant or even counter-productive narratives, either tested to have failed abysmally, or where there is current consensus among NGOs that they should be avoided.

We are a country of immigrants

Most European States do not consider themselves countries of immigration, despite their histories or current demographics (Austria, for example, has been one since at least 1989, and in Sweden 18% of the population is foreign born). Amnesty International advises against using the 'nation of immigrants' meta-narrative anywhere, even in North America or Australia, because it always falls flat in testing.

How we are treating refugees/migrants should make us ashamed of our country (or is a betrayal of European values)

Shame is a counter-productive emotion to invoke, especially when so many in the 'middle' are relatively patriotic. The emphasis on national or even European ownership of values is also unhelpful in reinforcing an us/them frame.

Individual extremes of victimhood or virtue

Victimhood: Fund-raising materials often still have a strong element of this narrative, albeit mixed with a little bit of human agency, because it is effective for opening people's wallets (girl children being the most effective 'victims'). However, such 'benevolent othering' is universally considered counter-productive when aimed at shifting public attitudes towards positivity.

Exaggerated virtue or success: Excessive positivity can provoke a reaction of backlash/disbelief, as described in the MPI report 'Communicating Strategically about Immigrant Integration'; focus on exceptional individuals can also reinforce the disconnect between individual experience and opinion on national policy as portrayed via the media.

Refugees and/or migrants as a dehumanised mass

Massification is problematic, according to numerous psychological studies, because of its dehumanising effects: the racist association of people with animals; removing belief in migrants' or refugees' capacity for suffering; removing identity and individuality. MSF frankly regretted that it had little choice but to unintentionally contribute to the negative visualised 'invasion narrative' every time they have to show the world that there is another near-sinking boat to be rescued. This is an inescapable dilemma for many organisations that bear witness.

Migration is pay-back for colonialism, or for European interference in other regions

Guilt is an ineffective trigger compared to pride, and the creditor/revenge narrative ('We are here because you were there') is deliberately designed to poke people in the 'middle' with a stick. While there may be truth in this meta-analysis, it is a generally counter-productive narrative for promoting social change.

Germany's particular relationship with historical atonement, however, may make this narrative more effective there, despite Germany's lack of colonial history: MiC German research, which tested the line that 'European countries are responsible for the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. They should therefore play their part by accepting refugees', found that 56% of Germans agreed (especially those who were 60-70 years old). This included, surprisingly, 43% of those who were 'Radical Opponents' to immigration (MiC, 2017, pp. 12 and 60).

It's not that we've made actual mistakes with migration policy; we just didn't communicate well enough with enough people

A number of IGO statements in recent years have turned into rather self-involved public communications about public communication tactics themselves: telling the public, 'We're going to go local and start listening to you more' rather than actually doing so. Elites talking a lot about the 'middle' can also make the middle feel patronised and manipulated, especially once the middle is in the room, in the form of local government bureaucrats or partners from trade

unions or churches or professional associations. This is, in other words, a perfectly accurate 'mea culpa' statement that it is valid to make internally, but not a statement that will resonate beyond the 'bubble'.

NARRATIVES THAT MAY OR MAY NOT RESONATE, OR THAT ARE CONTINGENT ON TIME AND PLACE

The findings of this mapping were inconclusive with regard to a number of narratives, where practitioners varied in their conclusions about effectiveness, or where different national/local contexts may explain varying results.

Start thinking and talking about 'the elephant' again?

Amid the positivity of strategic communications and its hope-based narratives, there remains debate about acknowledging and addressing the fear, anger and misconceptions held by the 'conflicted middle' within a progressive narrative. The received wisdom since George Lakoff published his seminal book, *Don't Think of an Elephant* (2004), is that responding only reinforces negative frames, and keeps them in circulation. However, this mapping discovered a significant number of NGO communicators who are now taking the slightly heretical view that immigration behaves differently from other social issues and if you try to avoid 'the elephant' it still doesn't leave the room – i.e. the 'conflicted middle' stays mired in internal conflicts.

Acknowledging grievances is not quite the same as refuting a negative frame, and the following projects all found better results in terms of attitudinal changes if they did talk about people's negative feelings and concerns:

- 'Stay Human' in the Netherlands previewed the fact, when interviewed, that they are gathering evidence of this need to talk about the negative narratives before moving forwards constructively.
- CILD believes that, when working a local level, it is vital to start from people's fears and worries (i.e. money and jobs).
- British Future found that when an immigrant was saying 'I don't claim benefits' (i.e. mentioning the elephant) then it marginally increased the effectiveness of the narrative with the 'middle' (from 63% to 70%).
- Anat Shenker-Osario has meanwhile done extensive testing to prove that, in the US at least, adding racism into a narrative about people's financial worries does not crater support for the message but quite the reverse: it turns a losing progressive message into a winning one (*Washington Post*, August 2018).

This relates to the recommended 'ethical journey' narrative outlined above.

The path to citizenship / permanent vs temporary statuses / access to benefits

Geographic variability of public attitudes on these questions leads to the need for geographical variation in narratives. US surveys of public opinion about which factors should create a pathway

to citizenship found that completing education in the US was not considered sufficient, while completion of military service was. CILD in Italy, on the other hand, is likely to argue for children of newcomers to get citizenship after they complete a cycle of schooling. In Britain, the middle is divided about whether they prefer migrants to stay and integrate well, or go back home as soon as possible (British Future, 'How to Talk', 2014). Public ambivalence about long-term vs temporary/flexible labour migration is also hard to unpick because the majority of social science research on diversity relates only to the former.

Message testing suggests most of the effective narratives on citizenship processes relate to creating more procedural fairness (as opposed to any relaxation of citizenship rules), and this guidance will likely be applied to at least one forthcoming campaign on youth citizenship for children who have inherited irregular status from their parents.

14 countries were surveyed in 2008 and 2016 by the European Social Survey and were asked 'when should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits and services?'. The available responses were 1) 'Immediately on arrival', 2) 'After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked', 3) 'Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year', 4) 'Once they have become a [country] citizen', 5) 'They should never get the same rights'. The national answers were surprisingly heterogenous, suggesting that this is not a promising area for pan-European alignment of narrative (Dennison and Drazanova, 2018).

'If you were invited here to contribute, or have been here a long time and integrated fully, you should have a legal status that reflects this and gives you security.' This was, essentially, the progressive narrative in Germany about citizenship for Turkish guest workers and in the UK when the recent Windrush scandal broke. But some worry that this is to fall into the 'good vs bad migrant' trap again; they prefer a more sweeping narrative of 'No one is illegal'.

Migration brings economic benefits

Contribution narratives are widely used at all levels (micro, mid and meta) and are of different kinds (economic, social and cultural). Economic justifications of immigration are linked to contribution narratives but, on the whole, there has been a move away from using economic evidence to communicate with the European 'middle'. Some dislike economic narratives because they instrumentalise (and, in a sense, dehumanise) newcomers, or because they imply that non-contribution, receiving benefits or other government aid, is shameful. Other progressives dislike them for maintaining an 'us/them' framework, and some leftist progressives dislike them because they may suggest the need for more contributory national welfare systems, where newcomers can access certain benefits only after a certain amount of tax-paying.

MiC found that the 'business case' for immigration was only effective with 38% of those surveyed in Germany in 2016 (MiC, 2017, p.15) and the idea that national economic prosperity places a global obligation on that nation was equally unpersuasive (p.60). On the other hand, there is American evidence from 2014 (tested on some 13,000 individuals) that the economic frame and the moral frame are both effective, but only when not tied together into a single narrative.

For many NGOs, such as ENAR in their 'Hidden Talents' report, the narrative includes a villain in

the form of the policy makers: 'Migrants want to contribute but you're stopping them'. Similarly, the NEON/NEF/Frameworks/PIRC report, 'Framing the Economy' recommends the message: 'Migrants contribute to the economy. It's footloose capital and the war on organised labour that has kept wages down.'

Several interviewees were aware of repeated advice to avoid economic fact-based arguments but had decided to use in them in limited, targeted ways. So, for example, CILD uses them at local level, to evidence that the Italian towns who are refusing to welcome migrants and refugees are the ones who are suffering economically, running budget deficits, and struggling to pay fines. They have found, in practice, that the general public pays more attention to these local facts, of direct relevance to their pockets, than to other facts and national statistics. HumanRights360 has a project on promoting the independence and self-reliance of recognised refugees in Greece, but it is notable that the top action listed on their website project description is teaching refugees how to submit their taxes. This is clearly music to the ears of the 'conflicted middle'.

We need migrants because Europe is aging

Demographic arguments, like economic ones, are not eternally positive, but are contingent on time and place. EUI research concludes that the impact of immigration on population trends is short-lived because fertility behaviour catches up quickly.

Politicians like to use this argument[42] because it sounds hard-headed and practical, but Bakamo found it was a key point of public debate in only a few countries in its pan-European data-scrape of social media.

Once again, CILD is not afraid to use demographic arguments, but again only at the local level, where they are speaking in a town that is depopulating and where hospitals and schools will have to close without newcomers.

PROBLEMATIC SILENCES AND OMISSIONS

Issues other than integration?

In Europe and North America, progressive narrative development work about migrants and refugees is overwhelmingly and increasingly dominated by the production of integration stories: both short-term integration in record time and longer-term evidence of cultural convergence.[43] This is clearly because integration is a more 'moveable' issue than hard issues of entry and exit, borders and returns, lending itself to positive imagery of ordinary people cooperating across ethnic and religious differences. It is also less blighted by technical issues requiring legal understanding. (This bias towards integration narratives is particularly strong in the autumn and winter months when spontaneous arrivals are not coming so frequently.)

Several interviewees said that this bias is strategic because if they can persuade the European public that the 2-3 million who most recently came are being peacefully absorbed, then the door may be open the next time. If that project is not perceived as a success, then that – more than anything – is going to determine the attitudes of the 'conflicted middle' to every other migration-

related issue.

The idea that positive perceptions about integration will bank goodwill and can be wrapped back around to more liberal opinions about migration policy, however, does not grapple with the percentage of the 'middle' who favour the so-called 'Australian model': harsh conditions deterring entry and, at the same time, inclusive integration policies for those resettled or otherwise admitted. The analogy from the US are the 16% of voters after the 2016 election who favoured both the legalisation of undocumented migrants and building a border wall with Mexico (Edison Research Election Exit Poll, 2016).

Don't mention rights?

Most refugee and migrant advocates still talk about human rights when their audience consists solely of governments who need reminding of their obligations. But, in general, 'rights-based language' has become a taboo in the world of values-based communications.[44]

This ignores the important practical differences between rights-based actions and actions taken based on grounds of compassion, charity or mercy, and/or personal or political discretion. Sometimes 'human dignity' will serve as a synonym, but not always – see, for example, the failure to present those at the US-Mexico border as asylum seekers exercising a right, with even Nancy Pelosi describing them purely as 'a humanitarian challenge', meaning that the situations in the relevant countries in Central America have been inaccurately lumped together in terms of causation.

Even those who are explicit about only trying to mobilise and expand their base have put huge message-testing energy into thinking about less alienating ways of talking about human rights (e.g. as verbs, not nouns, which produce positive outcomes rather than being ends in themselves). But they, at least, do not leave them entirely unmentioned – often because they have human rights too clearly in their names or mandates. In the migration sector, on the other hand, there has been an almost complete erasure of specialist terms like *non-refoulement* in communications work. Some observers, notably the leaders of refugee-led organisations interviewed in this mapping, are concerned that the international norm is also disappearing, and not entirely by coincidence. It may be that a more concerted effort to communicate the continuing value of legal norms needs to be launched, targeting certain educated and influential audiences, in parallel with wider public communications investment.

National security and anti-Muslim sentiment in relation to immigration

Researchers and interviewees are united in seeing a gear change in terms of how security concerns have overtaken all other concerns about immigration – masked by the fact that it was always one element in the extremist narrative playbook. Both mid-level and positive micro-level stories are instantly forgotten the moment that a Muslim refugee or immigrant commits any act of violence and it hits the headlines. UK and US studies have found that 80-90% of coverage of Muslims in the media was negative between 2001-12 (Allen, 2012). There is no reason to think that statistic has improved very much in the last seven years.

Bakamo research has mapped how different normative threats dominate the public imagination in different European countries and at different times. Based on a vast quantity of unfiltered social media conversations and shares about migration (45 million items exchanged between 1 August 2017 and 1 August 2018 that were scraped using keywords) they concluded that across the EU, security and identity narratives subsume all others, and security is directly inversely correlated to the frequency of altruistic, humanitarian narratives.

Anti-Muslim sentiment, and the belief in cultural incompatibility, was also admitted to be a growing underlying issue across Europe, even as attitudes to migration gradually improve. Yet few progressive narratives in the European migration or integration sector ever address it head on.[45]

The removal of the language of human rights from public debate is particularly unfortunate for this issue because it leaves no way for advocates to talk about the careful case-by-case balancing of religious and other rights. Recent years have seen a strange alliance between anti-Muslim populists and some of the most liberally progressive (e.g. trans rights or feminist) campaigners in Europe, as well as with some anti-Semitism and free speech campaigners. Each country also adds its own nuance to the debate (the French extreme of a burkini being torn from the body of a Muslim woman on the beach; the North American controversies over the attempted use of religious law in family arbitration; the Greek ambivalence based on its long history with Turkey), meaning that alignment of narrative is tricky.

A February 2017 Chatham House survey based on interviews with 10,000 people across 10 European countries asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement, 'All further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped'. The majority of those surveyed in 8 out of the 10 countries agreed with the statement.

The broader surveying of public attitudes to newcomers and integration is not sufficiently capturing this underlying, corrosive fear and hostility. MiC should be commended for addressing the issue distinctly in their more recent reports,[46] but generally the migration and integration sector seems to be in denial, or too nervous to give this issue the attention it deserves, pretending to a kind of religion-blind, legalistic 'equality' position, but without legal language.

To EPIM and other funders:

- **NGO advocates and communicators in more European countries need to be equipped with in-depth national audience research**, complete with applicable recommendations for effective narratives. All the main expert research, 'catalyst' and advisory organisations such as ICPA, ASO Communications, Counterpoint, D|Part and More in Common should be invited to some collective planning to agree a strategic division of labour.

- **National alignment and stronger national or regional network building** around strategic communications needs to take place in most European countries, with frank discussion about the different audiences that organisations seek to reach, the specialised aspects of the migration debate that they each cover, and any unnecessary duplication or gaps. More traditional service-delivery and humanitarian aid organisations should also be brought into these initiatives in the near future.

- While there is **potential for narratives to align across Europe**, or even globally, despite local specificities, this is not an ambition that should take resources from other priorities and it need not be Brussels-based, as some of the most dynamic practitioners are those working at national level. Platforms/NGO networks/communities of practice for sharing audience research or messaging guidance should be strengthened, and a system to help elevate and translate many more powerful local narratives to the national and international levels should be constructed.

- NGOs, including those from other sectors, can be supported to equip one another with the **know-how to conduct focus groups, testing, and other kinds of 'social listening' for themselves**, as well as more iterative message testing in the field. Real-life demonstrations, to which representatives of other organisations are invited, rather than presentations of theory, may be the most inspiring means of sharing expertise. Rather than hiring external agencies, greater expertise and institutional memory could then reside within the sector itself.

- **Encourage and fund evaluation of impact**, especially when large-scale investment in audience research and narrative development is made. Narrative development work

that includes evaluation of changing cultural norms requires funding with as long a timeframe as possible; in some contexts, it could involve cost-sharing with major arts funding bodies or patrons, or even investment in a specialised migration-focused cohort study. Evaluations acceptable to funders should move beyond social media metrics and polling results to more qualitative measures, such as the views of an organisation's newly recruited volunteers or members (if aiming to expand the base) or the views of decision makers about their perceived room for manoeuvre (if targeting the middle segments of an electorate).

- In order for the strategic communications of NGOs in the sector to have **authenticity**, they must reflect realities of projects on the ground that demonstrate solidarity or reciprocity, and/or take a whole-community approach, as well the reality of an active membership and/or the full participation of migrants and refugees within organisations. **Funding of narrative development is inseparable from funding for these aspects of organisational operation and transformation**, including hiring community organisers and others experienced in building social movements from the grassroots up.

- **Governmental and non-governmental communicators** who are meeting in their separate spheres to talk about similar communications research and methodologies should establish **regular points of neutral intersection** to exchange new developments with one another – possibly via mutual partners at local government/municipality level.

To academic and NGO researchers:

- Produce **easier-to-use evidence** about public perceptions, about the costs or contributions of newcomers at local level in key (contentious) places, and about the impact on newcomers, and on local residents, of particular border enforcement measures. Involve NGO advocates as consultants in the design phase of such research in order to ensure its relevance to current debates.

- Undertake further research, across several disciplines, on **whether it helps or hinders connection with a positive narrative to address your audience's fears and objections**.

- **Independent audience research agencies should continue establishing programmes that implement narrative development in practice**, based on their research, so that they gain an awareness of the challenges involved in implementation and in order to inspire change among those whose communication may be less strategic.

- They should also help to produce **more migration-related toolkits on framing and testing in local languages and adapted to local cultures**.

To EPIM grantees and other European NGOs:

- Clarify how you believe **the new EU Director General on Communications** should or should not be communicating with the public on migration issues, and advocate with

them accordingly.

- Develop communications partnerships with specialised organisations, or more in-house expertise, around **the issues of national security and anti-Muslim sentiment**, with a focus on how to communicate on these issues in ways that neither ignore nor confirm their perceived associations with newcomer communities.

- **Involve more people with migrant or refugee experience in the technical and intellectual processes of narrative development**, rather than seeing them merely as storytellers, products-for-sale, or messengers. Where possible, replicate models that take a long-term and respectful approach to elevating narratives of first-hand experience through the mainstream media or through popular culture.

- **Embed work on strategic human rights litigation within strategic communications**, creating narratives to carry the general public along with your cause and its journey.

Endnotes

1. See note in Appendix 2 for a working definition of 'narrative'. 'Narrative development' is understood to mean conscious efforts to frame, articulate, test, adjust and evaluate the narratives that are in professional use.
2. For a brilliant example of a journalistic 'frame' being flipped and thereby reversing the causation and solution analysis of a particular situation (the development of the 'ghetto' or 'vulnerable area' of Rosengård in Malmö and its problems), view this BBC report on Swedish immigration policy aired in August 2018.
3. These include, inter alia: 'No Cause is An Island' (Common Cause Foundation), reports such as 'More Than the Sum of its Parts' from the Human Rights Funders Network, 'Claiming the Narrative for Social Change' (Oak Foundation), 'More Than Words' (Thomas Paine Initiative).
4. **United States organisations** working on narrative development in this field who have been influential in Europe include: the Four Freedoms Fund of 15 donors under the auspices of NEO Philanthropy, which funds the Opportunity Agenda, a US communications lab on a range of social justice issues. Opportunity Agenda also heads the Immigration Research Consortium, which hosts a closed source library of public attitudes research for advocates and a monthly conference call that usually involves 50+ immigration advocates discussing the latest research developments.
   Other US communications hubs include: Our Story, ReThink Media and DC-based America's Voice, which was established to be a centralised hub for the campaign (of some 100 organisations) for comprehensive immigration reform. Frank Sharry, the ED of America's Voice, appears to have been hugely influential in Europe as an individual, with his advice on narrative development often cited by interviewees.
   Other American influencers mentioned by interviewees in Europe include: Working Narratives and The Frameworks Institute, neither of which are solely or even primarily focused on migration; the American Immigration Council; Over Zero; and the ongoing expansion of Welcoming America into Europe as Welcoming International. The Ford Foundation has invested in a Narrative Initiative, which seeks to research and catalyse narrative development across a range of sectors, including migration, however its name did not come up in the course of these interviews (which did, however, conclude prior to their 27 June event for North American and European organisations titled 'Narrative Strategy in a Populist Moment').
5. The SCI 'Migration Learning Exchange' took place between organisations in the USA and Europe between 2015-18. A report from a May 2016 event in Washington DC on 'Honing the Message', for example, mentions a range of mainly British participants, but also the Dutch Vice Chair of ECRE and the Head of European Communications for Human Rights Watch. Those who attended said they had found these events very useful, though some noted that the 'exchange' was mostly one-way (America teaching Europe) and that they highlighted a key difference in style – namely American migration advocates being much more 'up front about power', meaning that they had no qualms about close alliance with political parties (e.g. only asking Democrats to advocate on immigration issues in States where it wouldn't lose them their seats).
6. It is worth noting that, thanks to the national background of its ED Tim Dixon, MiC's influences also derive from Australia, which is seen as one of the countries with the best communications networking in the voluntary sector on migration, thanks largely to the campaigns led by GetUp in response to the off-shore detention of asylum seekers in other territories.
7. However, there appears to be no expert unit in any European or North American mainstream newsroom that is focused on migration in the same way that the *NY Times*' 'environment pod' previously generated stories about that theme.
8. In **Austria**, the Red Cross has been vocal, as have a number of organisations working more broadly to counter the narratives of populism such as SOS Mitmensch. Caritas Austria is, according to its EU Office, strong on communications work, and the several international NGOs with headquarters in Vienna also contribute to a certain level of collaboration and learning. The **Czech Republic**, by contrast, has a formal consortium of refugee and migration NGOs named Migracnikonsocium (MK). Among their members, the most vocal in public communications work are OPU, the Association for Migration and Integration (SIMI), Diakonie, Caritas, as well as the Intercultural Centre of Prague (ICP) and the Centre for the Integration of Foreigners (FIT). In **France**, the main voices are CIMADE, France Terre D'Asile, Amnesty and SINGA, as well as the big Catholic charities like Caritas. All local French initiatives welcoming newcomers, no matter how tiny, are supposed to be mapped on a single self-declarative website funded by Fondation de France, and the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) is a research organisation which often convenes the French NGOs active on this topic. In **Greece**, there are a wide variety of organisations working in this area, thanks partly to their contacts with

SCI and EPIM (e.g. Solidarity Now, Human Rights 360, Generation 2.0 and Faros). In **Germany**, ICPA's hands-on work, through its Narrative Change Lab, is supporting several small NGOs (Deutsch Plus in Berlin, JUMA - an organisation of young Muslims in Stuttgart and Berlin, and Wir Machan Das), and they are just beginning to commence wider networking with civil society. On the NGO-side, MiC is working with SINGA, The Red Cross and Die Offene Gesellschaft, while Caritas, Oxfam and Pro Asyl are also engaged in public campaigns work. In **Hungary**, the only vocal NGO remains the Helsinki Hungarian Committee. Rather amazingly, they are working on creative ways to communicate with the general public, via youth groups and local media outside Budapest, that may be able to circumvent the State-controlled media and its propaganda. **Italy** (coordinated by CILD) and **Belgium** (coordinated by a platform called CNCD.11.11.11) were thought to have highly evolved national coalitions in the eyes of outside observers. In **Romania**, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) has developed two interesting social media campaigns that are off-shoots of international JRS campaigns, but there is little nation-wide coordination in a relatively small field. Stay Human coordinates a network in the **Netherlands** which includes nearly all the major refugee and migrant organisations there. In the **United Kingdom**, as already outlined, there is an active communications hub, iMix, which does not, however, communicate with the media directly, and another prominent and relatively new organisation, British Future, which does direct communications of its own, devoted to appealing to a broader than usual range of audiences. Both of these organisations regret the severe imbalance between the number of refugee and migrant organisations in Britain, with 'about 8 out of 10' of the country's 1500+ organisations only interested in refugees, and neither of them have yet managed to construct a broad coalition of NGOs around common narratives. Of the longer-established NGOs, Refugee Action and the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) are perhaps the most focused on public communications. Migration Exchange, an informal network of UK funders, alongside the Thomas Paine Initiative, which is also hosted by Global Dialogue but soon to wind down, has been a catalyst for narrative work in the British voluntary sector in recent years.

Though there are organisations working with sophistication on narrative development in a number of other European countries, the level of cooperation between organisations in those countries was not mapped.

9. Other (mostly American) organisations and experts speaking cross-sector from the basis of psychological research include: the organisation 'Wonder' that uses the 'Heartwired' approach to advise a list of clients on narrative tactics that move from fear to empathy; Mindbridge, whose ED Laura Ligouri has been working with human rights defenders in Europe; Amy Simon from Goodwin Simon Strategic Research who emphasises the importance of calming an audience emotionally (stopping the amygdala firing) before a narrative tries to connect in any other way; Jonathan Haidt's Open Mind site which aims to train you out of your cognitive bias; Prof. Robert Duffy's work on the psychology of perception; or the recent academic research on 'conviction narrative theory' (how we decide between conflicts of head vs heart) and on narratives that increase the belief that people can change (exposure to which increases the beliefs of citizens that newcomers will integrate successfully, for example).
10. Best known are Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey, as well as the polls of Ipsos Mori and the surveys of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. The World Values Surveys are also relevant to those crafting value-based narratives, as is the mapping of European values by PIRC & Equinet. There is an academic overview of all opinion polls in Europe and North America up to 2014 (confirming that 'sociotropic concerns' about the state of the nation, rather than personal economic experience, determine people's opinions), and in 2018 the Migration Policy Centre's Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration (OPAM) published another thorough analysis of existing polls throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region. The European countries included in this OPAM study were Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Spain and Sweden, with a timeframe stretching both before and after the 2015 'crisis', and there is a helpful summary of all the national studies and commercial polling by country. The Migration Policy Centre produced another report on the saliency of immigration issue in the Euro-Mediterranean region (with case studies of Hungary and Spain), primarily for an audience of governments and IGOs. A brief Data Bulletin (December 2018) on global public attitude surveys also features a helpful IOM infographic summary of which surveys cover which countries, and includes a European Social Survey summary of attitudes to 'accepting or excluding immigrants'.

    While Counterpoint's research on immigration, such as that in its report, 'Bonne Année' (2018), which looked in depth at locations in France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, is mainly qualitative, and while Bakomo's research using Big Data is more quantitatively focused, the methodologies of MiC, D|Part and OPAM are a mixture of qualitative and quantitative. Other surveys, with results broken down by country, if not by audience segment, include the March 2019 global survey from the Pew Research Centre, and the SCORE research on local support for the radical right in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, 2016-18.
11. It would be extremely helpful to rebuilding public trust in immigration and asylum systems if national policy were supported by genuine, nation-wide public consultations across the continent, of the kind conducted for decades by the Government of Canada, or by the NGO British Future in 2017.

British Future's methodology was to organise citizens panels with moderators in a range of locations, particularly outside cities and beyond southern England, combined with online surveys, then followed by a further survey of representative samples. The result was a kind of manifesto on all aspects of migration policy.

12. In the Czech Republic, for example, they regretted that the only data came from annual polling by the local Sociology Research Centre, which asked simply 'Do you think immigration is a problem?' and broke attitudes down by different migrant nationalities. In 2016, 80% saw it 'as a problem' but it was very unclear what exactly that meant. Now polls show 60-70% saying it is 'a problem' but only 30-40% saying it is a problem 'in their community'. This is helpful in confirming the hypothesis that the 2015-6 'crisis' was very much a mediated crisis in the Czech Republic, blown out of proportion and based more on the numbers arriving in neighbouring countries, but such results still do not tell advocates very much. MK has therefore commissioned 'Over Zero' to do an in-depth survey, as yet unpublished.
13. The Hungarian government, for example, delivered a questionnaire to every Hungarian of voting age under the guise of a 'national consultation on terrorism and immigration'. 8 million Hungarians were canvassed, using 12 leading questions such as: 'There are some who think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may have something to do with increased terrorism. Do you agree with this view?' (Refugees Deeply).
14. Hope Not Hate called them the 'immigration ambivalents' or 'culturally concerned'; ICPA called them the 'moveable middle'.
15. The American campaign-strategist Amy Simon, for example, admitted that she measures impact ultimately in terms of election results, as they are the final verdict on what has worked and what hasn't.
16. In one EUI survey, in line with Haidt's views, it was concluded that only four values – 'universalism', 'conformity', 'tradition' and 'security' – have strong effects on attitudes to immigration (Dennison & Drazanova, 2018).
17. This mapping was surprised to find a handful of major non-governmental organisations, predominantly Catholic and with broad mandates, who are choosing to go almost or entirely silent about their work in the migration sector. This was explained to be either because it doesn't 'sell' with the middle, whose support they needed for other causes, or for reasons of reputational self-preservation. Human rights organisations cited focus groups and surveys showing that refugee rights are always last on the list of rights that people consider vital (for example, an IPSOS poll in the Global Human Rights Survey in which the Right to Asylum came last). In some cases, particularly in central and eastern Europe, keeping the work under the radar is also a strategy to protect staff and premises from assault and insult – taken in the confidence that any other approach would also be relatively ineffective when the debate is so distorted. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee, for example, took a decision 12 months ago to talk less about migration in public and to give their other work on behalf of Hungarian citizens – on criminal justice and the rule of law – the prominence it deserves, but whenever there is a concrete human rights violation against refugees or migrants in Hungary they will still speak out.
18. Unbound Philanthropy makes a useful distinction between changing 'public debate' (measurable changes) and changing 'public opinion' (harder and longer term).
19. Again, interest in this work has been imported to Europe from the US, where there is similar work at 'Culture Strike' and 'Define American'. Unbound, as a transatlantic funder, is the clear bridge on the map in this case.
20. Stay Human, for example, has conducted a study together with the University of Utrecht about the attitudes of volunteers, analysing how they talk about their volunteering. Six students conducted interviews to identify existing frames and to test new frames. The aim is to build out from the base of 10,000 Dutch volunteers currently working with refugees, using their social networks to mobilise/ inspire others. Currently, for example, Stay Human and the University are beginning a project on expanding those who volunteer to be language coaches by appealing more to values of stimulation and self-direction than to values of benevolence.
21. There is, however, increasing evidence to suggest that the effects of such face-to-face, real-life encounters cannot be mimicked by simulated experiences. Paul Bloom (author of Against Empathy) has objected that virtual reality experiences, which have been developed by UNHCR and others in recent years, don't give you the 'refugee experience' because that isn't simply about being afraid at a border or in a boat. Rather, it's (usually) about emotions such as loneliness, home-sickness, shame at leaving others behind, or experiences of discrimination. American psychological research has also discovered that VR can only give you emotional empathy, not 'cognitive empathy', and the latter is what is needed to change opinion. To develop cognitive empathy, we have to make some effort ourselves to imagine what it might be like to feel something. The Young Republic in Sweden is an NGO who run educational simulations that do exactly that, asking people to think through their moral choices during games in which scenarios have been narrated (e.g. about a spaceship in the year 3000).
22. SINGA spread from Paris to 4 other cities and now is running in 20 cities in 8 countries. In 2018 alone they 'matched' 24,500 'buddies' and found 600 migrants places to be room-mates for 6-12 months. 60 projects also came out of their incubators within that one year.

23. SINGA regretted that most of its local buddies were women, but most of its newcomer clients were men – a fact that it was trying to change.
24. In this sense it is different from the coalition once run by the National Immigration Forum in the US, called 'Bibles, Badges and Business for Immigration Concern', which spent heavily on radio ads in which faith leaders called for immigration reform. In that case, it was a one-way donation of faith's influence to the pro-migrant cause.
25. The most successful British Future campaign so far is the #RememberTogether campaign with the British Legion, based on a 2013 study called 'Do Mention the War' about understanding attitudes to World War I. They were thinking in advance about the drivers to British national identity and what big moments of national narrative would be coming up soon. The campaign then worked in Bradford schools, made films with funding from Facebook, and microtargeted the anxious middle with split sample testing to see if they could influence their views on Islam. They saw a 12-point shift, which is substantial. They then planted stories about Muslim soldiers during World War I in the broadsheet newspapers and used the Legion as their messenger. The Legion started to sell the 'poppy hijab', which the conservative Telegraph put on its front page. This was a kind of implicit, visualised answer to an infamous 2011 story about a Mr Choudhury burning a remembrance poppy. The British Legion was involved in the campaign because of wanting to reach a younger and more urban audience to keep remembrance alive for future generations. One £3-4000 Facebook ad alone got 300,000 extra followers. The campaign was so successful that during 2019 the Legion is continuing with 'diversity' as its main theme, with British Future merely advising in the background.
26. ICPA hosted a big event around the testing in order to show a wider circle how it works. They believe this was probably the single most motivating thing they have ever done to spread the word about narrative development in this sector. The focus groups were in German, but with simultaneous translation into English for viewers behind a one-way mirror, of which there were about twenty (mostly from IGOs and Foundations). They watched the discussions for over 8 hours in total and then deconstructed results together. Above all, this exercise helped expert professionals to realise that they can't simply imagine themselves into the minds of the 'middle' if they are not from those segments themselves. More such demonstration of testing methodology, when it is being put into practice, would be extremely useful.
27. Campaigners funded by the Four Freedoms Fund in two California districts – Fresno and Orange County – and in Nashville, are currently developing a long-term canvassing project. They started in January 2018, sending people out to have 20-minute face-to-face conversations on doorsteps about undocumented migrants, using a starting script that had been only somewhat pre-tested and which they were free not to follow exactly. They almost immediately took it out into the field instead of bothering with focus groups, and the canvassers now have a call every evening on which they talk about what is working and what isn't, then tweak the basic script accordingly. A polling firm tested a baseline and is re-testing progress as they work, showing that they have achieved a 5-8% shift rate in people's attitudes, which still holds up 6 months after the doorstep conversation.
28. Recent research on media reporting on migration in Italy found that only 7% of reports on migration include a migrant's point of view, and only 0.5% of reports on other issues, such as unemployment, ask what migrants think about them. This is surely typical across Europe.
29. A human rights researcher working on the US-Mexico border, for example, spoke frankly about the perils of putting journalists in touch with vulnerable migrants in an unstable, fast-changing situation where she was unable to prepare the interviewee nor control the framing of the interview.
30. Large cohort studies are an interesting, previously untapped method of conducting longitudinal attitude research. There are only two centres for such studies – The Centre for Longitudinal Studies and Understanding Society – twin UK organisations that have no equivalent on the Continent. The first is just about to add its first question on immigration (based on a British Social Attitudes question) and the second has already started some work in this field. Funders may want to think about either applying for particular migration and integration questions to be included in these cohort studies, or setting up an entirely new cohort (children born in 2020 across Europe?) purely for the purpose of better studying immigration and integration issues in the years to come. Such a single-issue cohort has been funded by medical funding bodies in order to study sexual attitudes and lifestyle, for example.
31. It is a theory of change question as to whether the public, particularly its members who are not instinctively supportive, are being influenced as an end in itself, to create a more tolerant populace, or instrumentally, in order to create more space for liberal decision-making by governance actors. This difference of emphasis (closely correlated to, but not entirely synonymous with, choice of target audience) is important in terms of how success should be measured. Some organisations interviewed, such as Refugees Welcome International (RWI) clearly have expansion and mobilisation of their 'base', in order to take action (register to provide temporary accommodation to refugees) as their primary goal. For others, such as the European Network on Statelessness (ENS), they are appealing to the public because the effectiveness of their direct advocacy is hindered by a lack of public awareness about their issue, meaning that it fails to get prioritised by elected politicians or IGOs.
32. Some NGOs run projects with IOM to assist 'voluntary return' and therefore have a very different

narrative of such work than those who do not.

33. See Yudkin, p.40, for how this different framing of causation is psychologically critical.
34. At national level, several mid-level narratives can be strung together to create an over-arching narrative with coherence, if not a 'meta-narrative'. For example, the SCI report on Northern Ireland concludes with the suggested line: 'For years now, people have come to Ireland from different backgrounds with different beliefs. So long as they work hard and contribute to society, there is room, and a welcome, for them here.'
35. This narrative was born out by the SCI report on Irish attitudes which found a correlation – possibly causal, possibly not – between their largely positive and open, optimistic attitudes to immigration and their confidence as a country, both in terms of identity and as part of the EU.
36. McAweeney, Erin, 'Online Manipulation of Visual Content for Anti-Immigrant Propoganda', Witness Media Lab (2019)
37. It should be noted, however, that ECRE was using similar imagery back in the 1990s (of a pinball machine game, to describe the incoming Dublin system) and it did not win the case then. Academics such as Myria Georgiou have also written about the grammar of video games (containing zombies) which the 2015 media narratives resembled, and these are not frames that need reinforcing by critiques that may be too ironically subtle for the less educated members of the 'middle'.
38. Obviously overlaps with solidarity and reciprocity, but with the sense of a wider communal purpose. Some interviewees pointed out that calls to undertaking voluntary action 'together', aimed at the majority of a national public, still imply a racialised 'us/them' and don't make sense if read by a second generation migrant or a foreign national who has been resident in Europe for decades.
39. Jacques Derrida wrote on how hospitality always includes an element of control and conditionality. While one academic interviewed thought there was a 'general consensus' that the language of guest and host are now 'taboo', organisations like Welcoming International, and campaigns such as #WeAreWelcomingEurope, are still centred around that value. Sometimes it doesn't work, as when photos of rescue ships in the Med are captioned to talk about the 'crew and guests', but in southern Europe hospitality is a generally positive value closely tied to pride in Italian or Greek identity..
40. See European Social Survey Documentation showing that the growth of populism does not correspond to a growth in the number of people opposed to immigration. It is, rather, just sign of polarisation increasing. Also, opinion polls tend to reflect highly mediated national debates more than local experience.
41. Recent research from Bakamo suggests that most anti-immigrant communication on social media is really emanating from people who have felt previously unheard and are now using immigration and race as an attention-grabber, in order to get other concerns (about schools, jobs, depopulation etc) heard by European elites.
42. In December 2017 Dimitris Avramopoulos, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship boasted that 'The EU has granted protection to more than 700,000 people last year', something he argued was not only 'a moral imperative' but also 'an economic and social imperative for our ageing continent.'
43. See individual micro-narratives of successful integration, and – on the policy level – the emphasis on the 'crisis' being over, and entering a new phase: e.g. FRA press release of 15 March 2017: 'Taking the "crisis" out of migration: integration in the EU'
44. Frameworks Institute testing found, for example, that: "Appeals to respecting and honoring immigrants' humanity rather than their rights proves to be a more effective communications strategy…" and "rights-based language appears to inadvertently activate the *Immigrants As Them* cultural model".
45. OPU, a refugee organization in the Czech Republic that has invested in answering hateful comments they receive via social media following their public campaigns, uses the narrative 'It isn't fair to apply collective guilt after a crime' to counter view that Muslims are all terrorists. This is particularly effective when adding evidence of similar prejudice from western European media against eastern Europeans who commit crimes in their new countries of residence.
46. MiC testing in Germany found that to point out the rise in right-wing extremism as a counterpart to Islamic extremism was helpful, but it was unhelpful to talk about historical Christianity as extremist, probably because that is too negative, backwards looking and distant from people's terms of reference (MiC German report, 2017, p.73).

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